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ABSTRACT 
The 2008 amendments to the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) were intended to expand the protection against discrimination 
for persons with disabilities beyond the Supreme Court's narrow 
interpretation of who is "disabled." While the amendments and the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Americans 
with Disabilities Act· Amendments Act (ADAAA) regulations 
address some of the Court's narrow interpretations of the ADA, 
lower courts may still be able to limit coverage of persons with 
disabilities who are still able to perform tasks that involve a major 
life activity, which is limited by their impairment, and persons who 
have impairments with temporary or intermittent effects. Claimants 
may also be excluded if they fail to make a concrete comparison of 
their impairment to others in the general population and to other 
plaintiffs with similar impairments who have come before them, or if 
they fail to present professional evidence supporting the extent of 
their limitations. More importantly, courts may continue to make the 
largely factual determinations regarding whether the claimant is 
substantially limited in a major life activity, rather than allowing a 
jury to decide whether the claimant is covered by the ADA. 
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THE UNDERWHELMING IMPACT OF THE AMERICANS 
WITH DISABILITIES ACT AMENDMENTS 
Stacy A. Hickox 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Both the ADA and the American with Disabilities Act 
Amendments Act (ADAAA) require a plaintiff to establish that a 
major life activity is substantially limited to access the ADA's 
protections and right to accommodations.) The ADAAA was 
intended to reverse the effects of several Supreme Court decisions 
that limited the coverage of the ADA and to broaden the coverage of 
the ADA as suggested under the guidelines issued by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 2 Yet the ADAAA 
may not resolve all of the issues that Congress or disability advocates 
wanted to address. Neither the ADAAA nor the EEOC ADAAA 
regulations that were issued in March 2011 provide sufficient 
guidance for courts on how to determine whether a person is 
"substantially limited" in a major life activity so as to be considered 
disabled under the ADA.3 Moreover, courts may still be free to 
dismiss claims on employers' motions for summary judgment by 
making factual determinations about whether the claimant is 
"substantially limited," rather than allowing juries to make those 
decisions regarding ADA coverage. 
Some sections of the ADAAA specifically reverse the effects of the 
targeted Supreme Court decisions, including defining what is a 
"major life activity" and reversing decisions regarding mitigating 
measures and the determination of whether an employee is "regarded 
as" disabled.4 Congress also took aim at the limitations on the scope 
of who is "substantially limited" in major life activities so as to be 
considered a person with a disability. 5 Yet Congress may have 
missed the mark by failing to specify more clearly how a person can 
1. See 42 u.s.c. § 12102 (2006); ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 
§ 4(a), 122 Stat. 3555 (2009). 
2. Jeannette Cox, Crossroads and Signposts: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 85 IND. 
LJ. 187,188 (2010). 
3. See id. at 201-02; David K. Fram, The ADA Amendments Act: Dramatic Changes in 
Coverage, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 193,205-06 (2008). 
4. Cox, supra note 2, at 202-03. 
5. Id. at 202. 
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establish a "substantial limitation." Referring the issue of defining 
"substantial limitation" to the EEOC may also fail to make the ADA 
more inclusive, as Congress intended. 
The EEOC has issued regulations to help define who is 
substantially limited, as directed by Congress. 6 The agency even 
considered expanding the coverage of who is "substantially limited" 
in their ability to work, which their previous regulations had also 
defined more narrowly.? Yet the EEOC ADAAA regulations fail to 
resolve some of the most exclusionary issues for ADA plaintiffs 
when faced with a motion for summary judgment. 
These issues include exclusion from coverage based on one's 
ability to complete some tasks, like working, that might require the 
performance of the major life activity relied upon for ADA 
coverage. 8 In addition, claimants with impainnents having temporary 
or intennittent effects but who are still significantly limited may find 
themselves excluded because their impainnent does not occur often 
enough to be deemed "substantially limiting.,,9 Further, claimants 
may still need to establish a "substantial limitation" based on a 
comparison to the members of the general population. lo Lastly, 
coverage may still depend largely on the provision of medical or 
other expert testimony. II 
This article will analyze each of these issues, building on past 
research regarding the frequent and long-standing denial of many 
ADA claims on motions for summary judgment, to argue that the 
ADAAA and EEOC regulations fail to provide sufficient interpretive 
restrictions and guidance to courts as to how to address these issues. 
Thus, despite the Amendments, without specific language from 
Congress or more specific guidelines from the EEOC to reverse the 
limiting effects of decisions interpreting the ADA, ADA plaintiffs 
may still find themselves with claims dismissed on summary 
judgment by courts that choose to continue to interpret "substantially 
limited" narrowly. These courts may interpret the failure to address 
these significant issues as a "green light" to continue with their pre-
6. Fram, supra note 3, at 205. 
7. Id. at 205-06 
8. Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act: 
Assessing the ADA Amendments Act 0/2008, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 217, 226 (2008), 
available at http://www.law.northwestem.edullawreview/colloquy/2008/44/ 
LRCo1l2008n44Long.pdf. 
9. Id. at 227; see also Fram, supra note 3, at 212; Chai R. Feldblum et ai., The ADA 
Amendments Act 0/2008, 13 TEx. J. C.L. & C.R. 187,212-13 (2008). 
10. See Fram, supra note 3, at 207-08. 
11. !d. at 208. 
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ADAAA restrictive interpretations of what it means to be 
"substantially limited." 
At the same time, some courts may continue to employ a more 
expansive definition of "disability" in line with their pre-ADAAA 
decisions. Thus, plaintiffs bringing claims in these courts may 
continue to enjoy a more inclusive definition of "disability," which 
has allowed claims to at least get in front of a jury to determine if the 
person is "substantially limited" in a "major life activity." 
Therefore, at least some courts may continue to dismiss claims on 
motions for summary judgment without allowing juries to engage in 
the fact-intensive determination of whether a claimant should be 
treated as a person with a disability. For these reasons, the impact of 
the amendments to the ADA may be underwhelming at best. 
II. THE ADA LEGACY 
Persons with disabilities and their advocates had high hopes for the 
ADA when it was passed more than twenty years ago. The ADA was 
intended to provide protection against discrimination in employment 
for people with a "range of health conditions, even those not 
traditionally considered 'disabilities. ",12 The goal was to provide 
more "job opportunities for the disabled" and "to integrate them into 
the workplace" once they were hired. \3 More fundamentally, the 
ADA's proponents strove to "change the public's cognitive 
understanding of 'disability' by" covering "people with a range of 
medical conditions."14 The hope was that the ADA would provide 
"'a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of 
discrimination' on the basis of disability," and "'clear, strong, 
consistent, enforceable standards' for addressing such 
discrimination," similar to other nondiscrimination statutes' 
protections against discrimination based on "race, color, sex, national 
origin, religion, or age.,,15 
12. Sharona Hoffman et al., The Definition of Disability in the Americans with 
Disabilities Act: Its Successes and Shortcomings: Proceedings of the 2005 Annual 
Meeting, Association of American Law Schools Sections on Employment 
Discrimination Law; Labor Relations and Employment Law; and Law, Medicine and 
Health Care, 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'y J. 473, 483 (2005) (comments of Chai R. 
Feldblum). 
13. Michael Selmi, Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act: Why the Supreme 
Court Rewrote the Statute, and Why Congress Did Not Care, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 
522, 522 (2008). 
14. Hoffman et al., supra note 12, at 483 (comments ofChai R. Feldblum). 
15. Feldblum et ai., supra note 9, at 202 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 121Dl(b) (Supp. I 2007)). 
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In its employment section, the ADA was intended to cover those 
who are able to work, because they "are the ones who may face 
[employment] discrimination because of myths, fears, ignorance, or 
stereotypes about their medical conditions.,,'6 The National Council 
on Disability (NCD) has explained that Congress did not intend the 
ADA to treat nondiscrimination as something "'special' that can be 
spread too thin by granting it to too many people.,,'7 According to 
the NeD, "the ADA is premised on fairness and equality, which 
should be generally available and expected in American society.,,'8 
A. Few Claims Successful Under ADA 
Despite the high hopes for the ADA, employees who sought its 
protection against discrimination based on a disability have faced 
"long odds.,,'9 After just seven years of the ADA's application to 
employers, defendant employers had prevailed in 94% of cases at the 
federal trial court level and in 84% of cases taken up to the courts of 
appeal by losing plaintiffs. 20 These dismissals were attributed to 
employers' success on motions for summary judgment, where courts 
created an "impossibly high threshold of proof' for ADA plaintiffs. 21 
Experts have since found significant empirical evidence that ADA 
plaintiffs rarely succeed in litigated cases. 22 Win rates have 
decreased from 7.9% in the 1990's to 3% in 2004.23 By 2006, more 
16. Id. at 217. 
17. RIGHTING THE ADA, NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, 17 (Dec. 1, 2004), 
http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2004/DecI2004 [hereinafter NCD REpORT]. 
18. Id. at 71-72. 
19. Long, supra note 8, at 217; see also Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities 
Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARv. c.R.-C.L. L. REv. 99, 100 (1999) (noting 
that the defendant wins 84% of cases that are appealed); John W. Parry, Trend: 
Employment Decisions Under ADA Title I-Survey Update 23 MENTAL & PHYSICAL 
DISABILITY L. REP. 290, 294 (1999) (noting the small percentage of cases that 
succeed). 
20. Colker, supra note 19, at 100. In contrast, plaintiffs litigating cases under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) obtained reversals in 34% of the cases they 
appealed. Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 253-54 (2001). 
21. Colker, supra note 19, at 102. 
22. Sharona Hoffman, Settling the Matter: Does Title I of the ADA Work?, 59 ALA. L. 
REv. 305, 306 (2008) [hereinafter Settling the Matter] (citing Michael Waterstone, 
The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 58 VAND. L. REv. 
1807, 1813 (2005». 
23. Amy L. Allbright, 2004 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I - Survey 
Update, 29 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REp. 513,513-15 (2005); see also 
Amy L. Allbright, 2006 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I - Survey 
Update, 31 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REp. 328, 328 (2007) [hereinafter 
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than 97% of the 218 employment discrimination decisions that 
resolved an ADA claim resulted in the dismissal of the claim.24 
Beyond litigation, employees with disabilities may be more 
successful. One review showed that "employers [have been] 
reasonably responsive [to employees'] internal requests for 
accommodation, EEOC conciliations, and settlement negotiations.,,25 
Despite this potential impact of informal resolution of ADA claims, 
the ADA has not proven to improve employment opportunities for 
persons with disabilities. A 2007 review determined that there is "no 
evidence that the statute has substantially improved their employment 
opportunities as a groUp.,,26 The data on employment rates confirms 
this conclusion. 27 The Bureau of Labor Statistics report for 2009 
shows an unemployment rate of 14.5% for persons with disabilities, 
compared to a rate of 9% for workers without a disability, and the 
labor force participation rate for persons with disabilities is 21.5%, 
compared to a participation rate of 73.7% for persons without 
disabilities. 28 
B. Reasons Behind Courts' Narrow Interpretation of ADA 
The effects of the courts' narrow interpretation of the ADA have 
been significant, as shown by these low success rates for claimants 
2006 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title 1- Survey Update] (noting that the 
percentage of successful cases has declined in recent years). 
24. 2006 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title 1 - Survey Update, supra note 23, 
at 328. 
25. See Settling the Matter, supra note 22, at 307. 
26. Scott Burris & Kathryn Moss, The Employment Discrimination Provisions of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act: Implementation and Impact, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & 
EMP. LJ. 1,3 (2007). 
27. See, e.g., David C. Stapleton et aI., Has the Employment Rate of People with 
Disabilities Declined?, CORNELL U. EMP. & DISABILITY INST., 1 (Dec. 2004), 
available at http://www.ilr.comell.eduJedi/publicationsIPB_ EmpDecline.pdf; see also 
Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection? The 
Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL. ECON. 915, 917 (2001) 
(noting that post-ADA there was a decline in employment among disabled persons); 
Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 19-20 (2004) 
(noting a drop in employment rate for persons with disabilities during the 1990s); 
Thomas DeLe ire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 35 J. HUM. RESOURCES 693, 705 (2000) (noting that statistics show 
the ADA led to a relative decrease in employment). 
28. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't. of Labor, Persons with a 
Disability: Labor Force Characteristics - 2009 (Aug. 25, 2010), available at 
http://op.bna.comldlrcases.nsflidlrnroe-
88nsrh/$FilelDisabilities%20Employment%202009.pdf. 
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and the underemployment of persons with disabilities. Many believe 
that the Supreme Court of the United States "weakened the ADA by 
severely constricting the scope of who qualifies for its protection.,,29 
Similarly, the NCD has stated that the Supreme Court's "harsh and 
restrictive approach to defining disability places difficult, technical, 
and sometimes insurmountable evidentiary burdens on people who 
have experienced discrimination.,,30 
One expert, Professor Chai Feldblum, concluded that "[t]he 
expectations of Congress with regard to the ADA have not been met" 
because of the courts' narrowing of its coverage. 31 Indeed, Professor 
Robert Burgdorf has called the courts' narrow interpretations of the 
ADA "quite substantial in their detrimental effects" because many 
people with disabilities have found that "they no longer have the 
rights" provided in the ADA. 32 
Courts often have dismissed ADA claims at a high rate because the 
plaintiff has an impairment that is not substantially limiting-"[t]hese 
plaintiffs are simply 'not disabled enough. ",33 According to the 
NCD, the Supreme Court's narrow interpretations of the ADA 
definition of "disability" was "directly contrary to what the Congress 
and the President intended when they enacted the ADA law.,,34 
Indeed, in passing the ADAAA, Congress explained that "[w]hile [in 
enacting the ADA] Congress expected that the definition of disability 
under the ADA would be interpreted consistently with how courts 
had applied the definition of a handicapped individual under the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, that expectation has not been fulfilled."35 
Some experts attribute ADA plaintiffs' lack of success in 
workplace discrimination claims to a lack of acceptance of the 
ADA's protections among the courts, employers, and other members 
of society, and an unwillingness to accept the disabled or "the notion 
29. Bradley A. Areheart, When Disability Isn't "Just Right": The Entrenchment 0/ the 
Medical Model of Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 83 IND. L.J. 181, 181-82 
(2008). 
30. NCD REpORT, supra note 17, at 72. 
31. Chai R. Feldblum, Roundtable On: The Americans with Disabilities Act and the ADA 
Amendments 0/2008, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 232, 232 (2007). 
32. Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., Restoring the ADA and Beyond: Disability in the 21st 
Century, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 241,251 (2008). 
33. Areheart, supra note 29, at 217 (quoting Ruth O'Brien, Defining Moments: 
(Dis)ability, Individuality, and Normalcy, in VOICES FROM THE EDGE: NARRATIVES 
ABOUT THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 40, 100 (Ruth O'Brien ed., 2004)). 
34. NCD REpORT, supra note 17, at 42. 
35. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)(3), 122 Stat. 3555 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. II 2009)). 
2011] Underwhelming Impact of the ADAA 427 
that the ADA is about rights and equality.,,36 Courts interpreting the 
ADA may be responding to a perception that ADA plaintiffs are 
really just lazy, malingerers, or whiners. 37 Courts' resistance to the 
disability category of civil rights protection may also stem from a 
perceived connection between a disability and job performance. 38 
Professor Feldblum believes that "there are health conditions that the 
general public will simply not admit are disabilities because of all the 
negative stereotyping that comes with being disabled.,,39 
In addition, courts may be reluctant to place the burden of 
accommodation on employers to assist this group of employees and 
applicants,40 based on a public perception that disability 
accommodations are "potentially costly.,,41 Specifically, Professor 
Michael Selmi suggests that the Supreme Court did not want the 
ADA to become another vehicle for employees to recover damages 
based on workplace injuries, in addition to workers' compensation 
claims. 42 
A group of experts have also theorized that the narrow 
interpretation of the ADA's coverage may be based in part on a 
"medical paradigm for understanding disability.,,43 Under this model, 
a disability is treated as "'a personal, medical problem, requiring ... 
an individualized medical solution"'; because it is assumed that 
people with such individualized disabilities do not face a common 
societal problem, there is no need for social policy to address 
collective needs. 44 "The medical model views the physiological 
condition itself as the problem.,,45 Rather than focusing on the effects 
of society, "'the individual is the locus of disability. ",46 Thus, under 
36. Hoffman et ai., supra note 12, at 494 (comments of Michael Stein). 
37. Selmi, supra note 13, at 544. 
38. Settling the Matter, supra note 22, at 326-27; see also Matthew Diller, Judicial 
Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 
23 (2000) (civil rights model not ideal fit for issue of disability); James Leonard, The 
Equality Trap: How Reliance on Traditional Civil Rights Concepts Has Rendered 
Title la/the ADA Ineffective, 56 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1,5 (2005) (noting that ADA 
moved beyond traditional civil rights laws' focus on evenhanded treatment). 
39. Hoffman et aI., supra note 12, at 489 (comments ofChai R. Feldblum). 
40. Settling the Matter, supra note 22, at 327. 
41. Selmi, supra note 13, at 530. 
42. Id. at 556. 
43. Areheart, supra note 29, at 183. 
44. Id. at 185-86 (quoting MARY JOHNSON, MAKE THEM Go AWAY: CLINT EASTWOOD, 
CHRISTOPHER REEVE & THE CASE AGAINST DISABILITY RIGHTS 27 (2003)). 
45. Id. at 186 (citing PAUL T. JAEGER & CYNTHIA ANN BOWMAN, UNDERSTANDING 
DISABILITY: INCLUSION, ACCESS, DIVERSITY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 14 (2005)). 
46. Areheart, supra note 29, at 186 (quoting JOHNSON, supra note 44, at 27). 
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the medical model, some would see "discrimination against disabled 
people as rational [because it results from] their own bodies' 
deficiencies," unlike discrimination against other groups. 47 
The medical model contrasts with the social model, under which 
"the experience of being a disabled person consists largely of 
encounters with the many barriers erected by society-physical, 
institutional, and attitudinal-that inhibit full participation in 
mainstream life.,,48 Under the social model, "the experience of 
disability is not inherent or inevitable [based on a person's] particular 
medical condition.,,49 Instead, the focus is on the "particular social 
context in which [a person] with a disability lives and functions.,,5o 
Some believe that the ADA was adopted under this social model, 
with a goal of addressing "unwarranted and irrational discrimination 
on the basis of disability.,,51 Courts' narrow application of the 
definition of disability may therefore reflect their rejection of this 
broader social model in favor of the medical model. 
In addition to differences in theoretical approach, the narrowing of 
the ADA's coverage also may have occurred because of a lack of 
"political will," through public support or influential lobbyists, to 
push for a broader interpretation of the ADA. 52 With these forces at 
work, one expert concluded that "[a ]bsent either inexplicably clear 
statutory language or broad public support, it was surely a mistake to 
think these nontraditional disability issues might be favorably 
received in the courtS.,,53 
The statutory language of the ADA was far from "inexplicably 
clear,,,54 such that the vagueness of the statutory language itself may 
have led to its narrow interpretation. Experts agree that the original 
ADA's definition of "disability" was vague. 55 This lack of clarity as 
to who is "disabled" has generally led to a lack of consensus 
regarding who qualifies as "disabled" under the ADA. 56 Courts may 
have responded to this vagueness by summarily agreeing with 
47. ld.atI90. 
48. ld. at 188. 
49. ld. at 189 (citing Talk of the Nation: Beyond Affliction: Culture of Disability (NPR 
radio broadcast May 4, 1998)). 
50. ld. 
51. ld. at 191; see also Burgdorf, supra note 32, at 265 (citing Linda Hamilton Krieger, 
Afterword: Socio-Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 476, 480-81 
(2000)) (noting that the social or civil rights model is the basis for the ADA). 
52. Selmi, supra note 13, at 527-28, 540. 
53. ld. at 546. 
54. ld. 
55. Long, supra note 8, at 218. 
56. Selmi, supra note 13, at 529. 
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employers that plaintiffs were not disabled, rather than applying a 
"flexible, individualized definition of disability. ,,57 Professor Paul 
Steven Miller agrees: "Coverage under the statute is determined by 
applying a contextual, flexible, individualized definition of disability, 
and our judicial system abhors vagueness.,,58 
Regardless of the reasons for the overall narrowing of the ADA's 
coverage, there is no disagreement that the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the statute's coverage so as to exclude many impaired 
persons from its definition of disability. 59 This may be based on the 
Court's "own preferences, both ideologically and institutionally, as 
guided by reigning social norms. ,,60 
Yet despite the Court's restrictive interpretation of whether an 
impairment substantially limits a major life activity, some appellate 
courts have interpreted the ADA more broadly than others. 61 This 
variation in judicial application of both the ADA and Supreme Court 
precedent is particularly apparent in the lower courts' consideration 
of a claimant's ability to perform some activities, the impairment's 
duration, a claimant's comparison to members of the general 
population, and the necessity of providing medical or other 
professional evidence of the impairment. The question remaining is 
whether the ADAAA and the EEOC's newly adopted regulations will 
resolve those conflicts and ensure that the ADA's protections and 
rights extend to everyone that Congress intended to cover. 
III. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
AMENDMENTS ACT 
While the courts have interpreted the coverage of the ADA 
narrowly, Congress has the authority to "rewrite the [ADA] to protect 
people who can work but whose disabilities have been excluded from 
coverage under the statute by the courtS.,,62 In 2008, that is what 
Congress intended to do. As early as 2004, the NCD had suggested 
57. Long, supra note 8, at 210 (citing Paul Steven Miller, The Definition of Disability in 
the Americans with Disabilities Act: Its Successes and Shortcomings, 9 EMP. RTS. & 
EMP. POL'y J. 473, 475 (2005); RUTH O'BRIEN, CRIPPLED JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF 
MODERN DISABILITY POLICY IN THE WORKPLACE 164 (2001) ("The federal courts and 
justices have essentially said 'enough,' and limited statutory coverage under Title 
I.")). 
58. Hoffman et aI., supra note 12, at 475 (comments of Paul Steven Miller). 
59. Id. at 527. 
60. Id. at 525. 
61. See infra note 184 and accompanying text. 
62. Burris & Moss, supra note 26, at 5. 
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that Congress should change the language of the ADA to correct the 
narrowing of the ADA's coverage by the courts, so that courts would 
be forced to make determinations about whether discrimination had 
occurred, rather than focusing on the extent of the claimant's physical 
or mental condition. 63 As envisioned under the social model 
described earlier, the goal was for ADA claims "to mirror litigation 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act," with the focus on whether 
discrimination occurred because of one's membership in a protected 
group. 64 
A. Redefining Disability 
The ADAAA attempts to clarify the meaning of "a substantial 
limitation of a major life activity" as the basis for ADA coverage. 65 
The Findings and Purposes section expresses "Congress' expectation 
that the [EEOC] will revise that portion of its current regulations that 
defines the term 'substantially limits' ... to be consistent with this 
Act, including the Amendments made by this Act.,,66 
Generally, the ADAAA requires that "[t]he definition of 
disabilityD ... be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals 
under [the ADA], to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of 
[the ADA].,,67 Congress stated in its Findings and Purposes section 
that the EEOC's regulations that "defin[e] the term 'substantially 
limits' as 'significantly restricted' ... express[] too high a standard" 
and are "inconsistent with congressional intent.,,68 The Amendments 
further reject the Supreme Court's directive that the ADA's terms 
should be "interpreted strictly.,,69 
Instead, Congress specifically instructs courts that "[t]he definition 
of disability in [the ADA] shall be construed in favor of broad 
coverage of individuals.,,70 In addition, the ADAAA directs the 
EEOC to define the term "substantially limits" through regulations. 71 
This may have been a compromise to get the bill passed, since the 
63. Feldblum et aI., supra note 9, at 224-25. 
64. Id. at 225. 
65. ADA Amendments Act of 200S, Pub. L. No. 110-325, §§ 2(b)(1}-(2), (4}-(5), 4(a), 
3(4)(B), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554-55 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. § 12102 (Supp. II 
2009)). 
66. ld. § 2(b)( 6). 
67. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A). 
6S. ADA Amendments Act of200S § 2(a)(S) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12102 
(Supp. II 2009)). 
69. ld. § 2(b)(4). 
70. Id. § 4(4)(A). 
71. ld. § 2(b )(6). 
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ADAAA bill had been moving slowly when it defined "substantially 
limits" as "materially restricts."n 
In its stated purposes, the ADAAA also suggests that "[t]he 
question of whether an individual's impairment is a disability under 
the ADA should not demand extensive analysis.,,73 However, the 
revised definition of disability in the ADAAA does not include 
specific language fulfilling this purpose. 
The definition section of the ADAAA provides some specific 
guidance, and yet it also neglects some controversial issues regarding 
ADA coverage. This section changes the definition of disability to 
exclude consideration of "the ameliorative effects of mitigating 
measures, such as-medication," artificial aids, "assistive technology; 
reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids or services; or learned 
behavioral or adaptive neurological modifications.,,74 Impairments 
are to be evaluated in their unmitigated state. 75 
The ADAAA also provides specific coverage for an employee or 
applicant who establishes that an employer regards him or her as 
having an "impairment.,,76 This coverage no longer requires that the 
employer be shown to regard the person as being "substantially 
limited in a major life activity.,,77 Thus, the claimant need only prove 
that the employer believed the employee or applicant was impaired 
and took some adverse action based on that belief. 78 
Despite the differences in theoretical approaches applied to 
interpreting the original ADA, the ADAAA does not resolve the 
debate about the ADA's theoretical foundation as a medical model 
versus a social response similar to the basis for other civil rights 
statutes, designed to remove the obstacles that persons with 
disabilities experience. 79 Nor do the Amendments take a position on 
the debate as to whether the ADA represents a "welfare benefits 
regime [providing] preferential treatment to persons with 
72. Fram, supra note 3, at 206. 
73. ADA Amendments Act of2008 § 2(b)(5). 
74. 42 U.S.c. § 12102(4)(E)(i)(I)-(IV) (Supp. II 2009). 
75. See H.R. REP. No. 11 0-730, pt. 2, at 8 (2008). This provision will provide coverage 
that most courts allowed prior to the Sulton v. United Air Lines decision, so that many 
more individuals will be considered currently disabled. See Fram, supra note 3, at 
217. 
76. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A). 
77. Id. 
78. Edward G. Phillips, The Law at Work: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008: Who Isn't 
Disabled? 45 TENN. B.l. 33, 40 (2009). 
79. Cox, supra note 2, at 188. 
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disabilities."80 This omission may help support the position of those 
who believe that social factors do not significantly contribute to the 
segregation and limited opportunities experienced by persons with 
disabilities. 81 
The revised language in § 7 of the Findings and Purpose section 
includes "a more modest depiction of persons with disabilities' 
subordinated status." 82 "It explains that 'physical or mental 
disabilities in no way diminish a person's right to fully participate in 
all aspects of society, yet many people with physical or mental 
disabilities have been precluded from doing so because of 
discrimination. ",83 Courts could conclude that this language 
"weakens the connection between the ADA and the political 
subordination rationale for disability-related accommodations.,,84 
Other controversial issues are not directly addressed by the 
ADAAA and may therefore continue to provide the basis for denial 
of ADA coverage, or at least extensive litigation. These issues 
include exclusion from coverage based on one's ability to complete 
some tasks requiring the performance of a major life activity, 
impairments having temporary or intermittent effects, the need for 
comparison to the members of the general population, and the need 
for medical or other expert testimony. 
IV. VAGUENESS OF SUBSTANTIAL LIMITATION 
REQUIREMENT 
The ambiguity of the term "substantially limits" has led to a 
substantial amount of litigation regarding coverage of the original 
ADA. Before considering these specific ambiguities, trends among 
the courts in making the more general interpretations of the Supreme 
Court precedent regarding "substantial limitation" are helpful to 
understand the underwhelming impact of the ADAAA. These 
decisions reflect a variety of approaches regarding the amount of 
evidence needed and the level of deference to be given to a jury to 
engage in the fact-intensive determination of whether a person is 
substantially limited in a major life activity. They also reflect 
differences among the courts as to how much "individualized 
inquiry" is afforded to a claimant who seeks ADA coverage. 
80. Id. 
81. Jd. at 190-9l. 
82. Jd. at 205. 
83. Jd. at 205-06 (quoting ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 3(1), 
122 Stat. 3553, 3554-54 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. § 12101(2)(a) (Supp. 11 
2009». 
84. Id. at 206. 
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Early in the life of the ADA, the Supreme Court held that being 
HIV positive could substantially limit the ability to reproduce, even 
though reproduction was still possible. 85 That Court explained that 
limitations need not rise to the level of "utter inabilities" to support 
coverage. 86 Moreover, the limitation could be considered substantial 
based on legal and economic consequences, not just based on 
physical constraints. 87 
The 1999 ADA Supreme Court decisions began narrowing the 
meaning of substantial limitation. 88 Emphasis was placed on 
individual determination, meaning that the application of the 
"substantially limited" requirement must be made on a case-by-case 
basis. 89 The Court's Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. decision dictated 
that a court examine the effect of the impairment on the life of the 
individual asserting ADA coverage. 90 Yet in the same year, the Court 
recognized that "some impairments may invariably cause a 
substantial limitation of a major life activity. ,,91 
By 2002, in Toyota Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, the 
Supreme Court had further narrowed its view of substantial 
limitation, and yet the Court retained its emphasis on the impact of 
the impairment on the individual claimant and continued to require 
that ADA coverage be determined on a case-by-case basis. 92 The 
Court focused on "the effect of that impairment on the life of the 
individual," rather than the nature of the impairment itself. 93 
The EEOC also adopted this focus on individual analysis to 
determine the ADA's coverage. The ADA's original EEOC 
regulations explained that the term "substantially limits" meant 
85. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 640-41 (1998). 
86. Id. at 641. 
87. Id. 
88. See Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 564-66 (1999); Sutton v. United 
Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1999), superseded by statute, ADA 
Amendments Act of2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 42,47 U.S.C.). 
89. Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 566 (1999); see also Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483 (1999) 
(confirming that the analysis must be done on a case-by-case basis). 
90. See Didier v. Schwan Food Co., 465 F.3d 838 (8th Cir. 2006); Cassimy v. Bd. of Ed. 
of Rockford, 461 F.3d 932, 936 (7th Cir. 2006) (both citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483). 
91. Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 566. 
92. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002), superseded by 
statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42,47 U.S.C.). 
93. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) (2010)). 
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(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the 
average person in the general population can 
perform; or 
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or 
duration under which an individual can perform a 
particular major life activity as compared to the 
condition, manner, or duration under which the 
average person in the general population can 
perform that same major life activity.94 
The regulations went on to explain that these "factors should be 
considered in determining whether an individual is substantially 
limited in a major life activity": 
(i) The nature and severity of the impairment; 
(ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; 
and 
(iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected 
permanent or long term impact of or resulting from 
the impairment. 95 
The Supreme Court's emphasis on individual analysis and the 
specific factors referenced in the EEOC regulations strongly suggest 
that the determination of whether a claimant is substantially limited is 
a factual one. Prior to the passage of the ADA, the Supreme Court 
had stated that under the Rehabilitation Act, "the issue of whether an 
individual was disabled ... was a factual, not legal, question.,,96 
Some courts hearing ADA claims also have recognized that the 
interpretation and application of substantially limited involves 
assessing the value of evidence and the "credibility of witnesses, 
tasks historically given to the jury in our judicial system.,,97 This 
94. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1). 
95. ld. § 1630.2(j)(2). 
96. Dierdre M. Smith, Who Says You're Disabled?: The Role 0/ Medical Evidence in the 
ADA Definition a/Disability, 82 TuL. L. REv. 1,36 (2007) (citing Sch. Bd. of Nassau 
Co. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987». 
97. Bait. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935»; Bristol v. Clear 
Creek Cnty. Comm'rs, 281 F.3d 1148, 1158 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Edmonson v. 
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 625 (1991); see also Williams v. Phila. Hous. 
Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 763 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Gagliardo v. Connaught 
Labs., Inc., 311 F.3d 565, 569 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that whether an individual is 
substantially limited is a question offact». 
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approach allows juries to resolve the factual issues associated with 
determining whether a person is substantially limited. 98 
On a motion for summary judgment, the question should be 
whether the claimant has presented sufficient evidence so that a 
"reasonable jury could [find] that [the claimant is] substantially 
limited in one or more major life activities.,,99 To survive a motion 
for summary judgment, a plaintiff must present "'some evidence' of 
the substantiality of his impairment." 100 As one court explained, this 
requires only enough information about the disability so the jury does 
not need to speculate about the extent of the person's limitations. 101 
In a claim involving a sleep disorder, for example, the court, denying 
a motion for summary judgment, explained that because other courts 
had reached conflicting conclusions in the face of similar claims, 
"borderline cases like this tum on fact questions best left to juries 
rather than to judges ruling on summary judgment." \02 
Even the relatively conservative Seventh Circuit has noted that the 
Toyota Court may have set "'a higher threshold for the statute than 
some had believed it contained. '" \03 
98. See Kiphart v. Saturn Corp., 251 F.3d 573, 582 (6th Cir. 2001) (calling for an 
individualized, fact-specific inquiry into the effect of impainnent on plaintiffs life); 
Maziarka v. Mills Fleet Farm, Inc., 245 F.3d 675, 679 (8th Cir. 2001) (calling the 
detennination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity 
"highly fact-intensive"); Santiago Clemente v. Exec. Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 25, 32 
(1st Cir. 2000) (noting that determination of the question of substantially limits is a 
"fact-specific analysis"); Colwell v. Suffolk Cnty. Police Dep't, 158 F.3d 635,643 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (stating that substantial limitation inquiry is "individualized and fact-
specific"); Leisen v. City of Shelbyville, 153 F.3d 805, 808 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding 
that the record must include evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could find 
substantial limitation). 
99. Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 913 (8th Cir. 1999). 
100. Cheryl L. Anderson, Comparative Evidence or Common Experience: When Does 
"Substantial Limitation" Require Substantial Proof under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act?, 57 AM. U. L. REv. 409, 456 (2007). 
101. Huizenga v. Elkay Mfg., No. 99-C-50287, 2001 WL 640973, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 
2001). 
102. Desmond v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 944,957 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Compare Head v. Glacier 
Northwest, Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that a plaintiff claiming 
to get "five or six hours a night" for "months" had produced "sufficient evidence to 
preclude summary judgment"), with Swanson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 268 F.3d 307, 
316-17 (6th Cir. 200 I) (noting the inability to sleep more than 4-5 hours per night did 
not demonstrate substantial limitation in major life activity of sleeping). 
103. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789,801 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Dvorak 
v. Mostardi Platt Assocs., Inc., 289 F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2002». Yet in reviewing 
the claim of a Sears employee who could walk no more than a city block without her 
feet and right leg becoming numb, the court still concluded under Toyota that a jury 
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Despite the factual nature of this inquiry, many courts have relied 
on the Toyota Court's narrow interpretation of "substantially limits" 
to dismiss ADA claims on summary judgment rather than referring 
factual determinations to a jury.I04 These courts require enough 
evidence to allow a jury "'to perform the careful analysis that is 
necessary to determine'" whether the claimant was substantially 
limited. 105 
This approach may stem from the Toyota Court's direction that the 
ADA's "terms need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding 
standard for qualifying as disabled." 106 The Court's strict 
interpretation arose from the ADA's finding that forty-three million 
people have disabilities. 107 The Court explained that "[i]f Congress 
intended everyone with a physical impairment that precluded the 
performance of some isolated, unimportant, or particularly difficult 
manual task to qualify as disabled, the number of disabled Americans 
would surely have been much higher.,,108 
Perhaps based on this fear that a broad definition of disability 
would result in an unmanageable number of ADA claims, some 
courts have refused to provide ADA coverage to employees based on 
common limitations like lifting restrictions or back injuries alone. 109 
This narrowing of the ADA's coverage may be based in part on 
concerns openly expressed by the Seventh Circuit that "recognizing 
claims arising out of back injuries will result in an inordinate number 
of ADA claims."11O Indeed, back injury claims have been 
characterized as "a specter that haunts the federal judiciary, their 
worst fear that the ADA has changed them into workers' 
compensation forums.,,111 
could find that she was covered by the ADA, based on her evidence showing her 
difficulty in walking as well as the jury's own life experiences. ld. at 802. 
104. See Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 231, 238 (1 st Cir. 2002); see also Sheehan v. 
City of Gloucester, 321 F.3d 21, 23 (1st Cir. 2003) (applying Toyota and finding that 
the plaintiff was not disabled under the ADA). 
105. Lebron-Torres v. Whitehall Labs, 251 F.3d 236, 241 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting Colwell 
v. Suffolk Cnty. Police Dep't, 158 F.3d 635, 645 (2d Cir. 1998»; see also Bartlett v. 
N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 226 F.3d 69, 80 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that a 
substantial limitation is a mixed question oflaw and fact). 
106. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002), superseded by 
statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42,47 U.S.C.). 
107. Jd. 
108. ld. 
109. Anderson, supra note 100, at 446. 
110. ld.; see also Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting a great 
number of Americans who are restricted by back problems but are not disabled). 
Ill. Anderson, supra note 100, at 446. 
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This narrowing of the meaning of "substantially limits" arguably 
has "dramatically changed the meaning of 'disability' under the ADA 
over the past number of years so as to make it almost 
umecognizable.,,1l2 Many claimants with disabilities "are never even 
given the opportunity to show they can do the job and were treated 
unfairly because of their medical condition," because they cannot 
meet this narrow definition of disability.ll3 According to the NCD, 
the Court's narrow definition of disability "represents a sharp break 
from traditional law and expectations" and "ignores and contradicts 
clear indications in the statute and its legislative history that the ADA 
was to provide a 'comprehensive' prohibition of discrimination based 
on disability, and legislative, judicial, and administrative commentary 
regarding the breadth ofthe definition of disability.,,1l4 
Other experts believe that the effect of the Toyota decision has 
been limited and that most claims dismissed based on the definition 
of disability were due to plaintiffs' failure to present sufficient 
evidence of the extent of their limitations. lIS One commentator 
concluded that "there is no evidence that the Toyota rationale is 
adversely affecting the claims of plaintiffs filing suit under the 
ADA.,,1l6 This observation may stem from some courts' 
interpretations of Toyota, which still allow for a jury to determine 
whether a claimant is covered by the ADA. 117 
Regardless of the degree of Toyota's overall impact, the cases 
outlined below show that diverse approaches to the definition of 
"substantially limits" have been taken by different courts. First, the 
ability to perform some tasks involving a major life activity has 
resulted in the dismissal of claims in some courts, but not in others. 
Second, there have been differences among the courts regarding how 
long is long enough for an impairment to be considered "substantial." 
Third, courts differ in comparison of the claimant's abilities to the 
abilities of members of the general population. Finally, there are 
inconsistent requirements as to the necessity of professional 
testimony to establish a substantial limitation. As foreshadowed in 
past scholarship regarding these disparities in judicial approach and 
112. Feldblum et aI., supra note 9, at 216. 
113. Jd. 
114. NCD REpORT, supra note 17, at 71. 
115. See Shawn D. Vance, How the Supreme Court's Toyota Decision Impacted the View 
of EEOC'S Regulatory Authority, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 475, 504 (2005). 
116. Jd. at 506. 
117. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 417 F.3d 789,800-04 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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interpretation of the original ADA, neither the ADAAA nor the 
EEOC regulations sufficiently resolve these issues. 
A. Ability to Perform some Tasks Associated with a Major Life 
Activity 
Many courts tend to focus on a person's abilities, despite an 
impairment, rather than the extent of their limitations. I 18 Professor 
Samuel Marcosson has noted that the Toyota Court "frame[d] the 
inquiry not in terms of what activities the individual cannot do or is 
substantially limited in doing ... but in terms of what the person can 
still do." I I 9 Lower courts often have relied on the claimant's existing 
abilities to conclude on motions for summary judgment that the 
person is not substantially limited in a major life activity. 120 
First, the ADAAA specifically states in its definition of disability 
that "[a]n impairment that substantially limits one major life activity 
need not limit other major life activities... to be considered a 
disability.,,121 This may address the suggestion by the Supreme Court 
in Toyota that if a person can perform most major life activities, they 
should not be covered by the ADA. 122 However, the ADAAA's 
statutory amendments do not directly address decisions that interpret 
Toyota to suggest that a major life activity must be of "central 
importance," thereby limiting coverage for someone who can 
perform some tasks that involve the major life activity in question. 123 
The EEOC's ADAAA regulations do make it clear, however, that a 
major life activity need not be "of central importance to daily life" for 
the person to be covered by the ADAAA.124 
The ADAAA specifies that a person can be covered by the ADA 
based on a substantial limitation of just one major life activity. 125 
However, this clarification may not be enough to prevent the 
exclusion of claimants who can still perform some tasks that involve 
118. See infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text. 
119. Samuel A. Marcosson, Of Square Pegs and Round Holes: The Supreme Court's 
Ongoing "Title VlI-ization" of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 8 J. GENDER RACE 
& JUST. 361, 375 (2004) (suggesting that further distinction be made between 
"collective categories" and "a single, discrete activity"). 
120. See irifra notes 126-39 and accompanying text. 
121. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(C) (Supp. II 2009). . 
122. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002), superseded by 
statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42,47 U.S.c.). 
123. See id. 
124. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(2) (2010). 
125. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2006 & Supp. II 2009). 
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a major life activity that is the basis for the claimant's ADA 
coverage. 
Professor Fram has warned "that the ADAAA reversed Toyotaonly 
as to how severe the impairment must be, not as to the relevant 
evidence on whether the impairment is substantially limiting," so that 
courts might still be willing to accept and rely on evidence of 
claimants' abilities to perform other activities. 126 Just as courts 
dismissed claims under the ADA if the claimant could perform some 
tasks associated with a major life activity such as caring for oneself, 
the ADAAA will not prevent a court from dismissing a claim by a 
claimant who cannot perform some significant tasks that are a crucial 
part ofa major life activity, if that person can perform some tasks that 
are part ofthat activity. Therefore, the ADAAA's admonition against 
requiring a limitation of more than one major life activity may not 
result in any fewer dismissals in these types of claims. 
Pre-ADAAA courts consistently granted summary judgment for 
employers based on the claimant's ability to perform some tasks. 127 
Summary judgment has often been granted to the employers of 
plaintiffs who sought ADA coverage based on an inability to care for 
themselves because the plaintiffs were able to perform certain self-
care tasks such as bathing, dressing, and driving. 128 For example, a 
nurse lost on a motion for summary judgment in part due to her 
inability to show a substantial limitation in caring for herself because 
of her back injury, despite her testimony that that she had difficulty 
performing certain tasks and was limited in performing household 
tasks like cooking and cleaning. 129 With deference to the decision in 
Toyota, the court concluded that because she could drive, bathe, 
brush her teeth, and dress herself, she was not substantially limited in 
the ability to care for herself. 130 
Even though Toyota was addressing the ability to perform manual 
tasks only, many appellate courts have applied this broad approach to 
impairments that affect some major life activity other than the ability 
126. Fram, supra note 3, at 210. 
127. Id. at 208. 
128. Thomas v. Avon Prods., Inc., No. 07-3924, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 10327, at *2 (6th 
Cir. May 8, 2008); Squibb v. Mem'l Med. Ctr., 497 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir. 2007). 
129. Squibb, 497 F.3d at 784. 
130. Id. (citing Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002)); see 
also Holt v. Grand Lake Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 443 F.3d 762, 763 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(ruling that an individual who has difficulty eating, cannot cut her nails, and 
sometimes needs help buttoning clothes was not substantially limited in the major life 
activity of caring for herself). 
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to perform manual tasks. 131 For example, one court refused to extend 
ADA coverage to three firefighters with Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), in part because the court was 
looking for an inability to perform a "variety of tasks central to most 
people's daily lives" under Toyota. 132 The court applied this 
approach even though the firefighters relied on a substantial 
limitation on their abilities to learn, not to perform manual tasks. 133 
Most courts have not provided much explanation of their 
application of the Toyota standard to other major life activities 
beyond the performance of manual tasks. I34 Yet one court explained 
its focus on the activities which could be performed: 
a finding of disability depends not on whether the plaintiff 
can perform every one of those functions [listed in the 
EEOC regulations], but on whether the net effect of the 
impairment is to prevent or severely restrict the plaintiff 
from doing the set of activities that are 'of central 
importance to most people's daily lives.' 135 
The ability to perform personal care tasks has also defeated coverage 
based on the ability to perform some tasks that involve the 
performance of a major life activity that is alleged to be substantially 
limited.136 For example, an employee with degenerative joint disease 
that limited his ability to grip, reach, lift, stand, sit, and walk at work 
131. Mack v. Great Dane Trailers, 308 F.3d 776, 781 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that there is 
no reason to limit Toyota's analysis to cases involving performing manual tasks); 
EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 306 F.3d 794, 802--03 (9th Cir. 2002) (ruling that 
the impairment must prevent or severely restrict use compared with how unimpaired 
individuals normally function); see also Waldrip v. Gen. Elec. Co., 325 F.3d 652, 655 
(5th Cir. 2003) (ruling that effects of impairment affecting eating must be severe); 
Mulholland v. Pharmacia & Upjohn, Inc., 52 F. App'x 641, 644-45 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(applying the Toyota analysis to the major life activity of learning); Rakity v. Dillon 
Cos., 302 F.3d 1152, 1158-60 (lOth Cir. 2002) (assuming without discussing that 
Toyota's holding was limited to the major life activity of performing manual tasks). 
132. Knapp v. City of Columbus, 192 F. App'x 323, 328 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Toyota 
Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 200-01 (2002), superseded by 
statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of42, 47 U.S.c.». 
133. Id. 
134. For example, in Mack v. Great Dane Trailers, in which the plaintiff attempted to 
distinguish Toyota on the basis of manual tasks, the court simply stated that "[ w]e see 
no basis for confining Toyota's analysis to only those cases involving the specific life 
activity asserted by the plaintiff in that case." 308 F Jd at 781. 
135. Nuzum v. Ozark Auto. Distribs., Inc., 432 F.3d 839, 846 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing 
Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198). 
136. See, e.g., Philip v. Ford Motor Co., 328 F.3d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir. 2003). 
2011] Underwhelming Impact of the ADAA 441 
was found not entitled to ADA coverage where he still mowed his 
grass, dressed and fed himself, and used stairs at home. 137 Similarly, 
an individual "whose ability to stand, tum, bend[, or] lift" was denied 
ADA coverage based on his continued ability to "perform household 
tasks such as laundry, washing dishes, and taking out the trash," even 
though he could only perform those tasks if they did not "involve a 
lot of bending." 138 Instead, these courts were willing to allow ADA 
coverage only where the claimant was prevented from, or at least 
severely limited in, performing any task that involved the major life 
activity, or activities that were offered as the basis for ADA 
coverage. 139 
Even for impairments that are not physically limiting, courts have 
looked at the ability to perform some tasks as evidence that the 
claimant was not limited in the major life activity relied on for 
coverage. For example, a claimant was not allowed to proceed to a 
jury trial based on a substantial limitation on his ability "to think and 
intera~t with others," because he was able to do many things 
involving these major life activities, such as working and teaching 
several days a week, serving as a local councilman, spending time at 
family and social outings, and working on weekends. 140 
The extreme effects of considerin& a claimant's abilities is 
illustrated by the claim of an applicant for a cart pusher position with 
Wal-Mart, who had mental retardation for which he received social 
security disability benefits. 141 Despite evidence that he was not hired 
because of his mental retardation and evidence of his limitations on 
his ability to learn, think, communicate, socially interact, and work, 
this applicant was unable to survive a motion for summary 
judgment. 142 Although the court acknowledged that the evidence 
showed that he was "somewhat limited in his ability to learn," 
summary judgment was granted for the employer based on his 
graduation from high school (but only with a certificate in special 
education), his attendance at a technical college, and his ability to 
read, "perform various types of jobs," and drive a car. 143 
Like his ability to learn, this claimant's ability to communicate was 
not substantially limited: he was able to be "interviewed for a job 
137. ld. 
138. Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix Inc., 339 F.3d 682, 685-87 (8th Cir. 2003). 
139. See, e.g., Philip, 328 F.3d at 1024-25. 
140. Lloyd v. Washington & Jefferson College, 288 F. App'x 786, 789 (3d Cir. 2008). 
141. Littleton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 231 F. App'x 874, 877 (11th Cir. 2007). 
142. Jd. at 876-78. 
143. ld. at 877. 
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without any accommodation," was "very verbal," and did "not need a 
job coach to communicate effectively with other people in the 
workforce."I44 This case illustrates how a person who was denied 
employment solely because of his disability could not tum to the 
ADA for relief, because the court focused on his ability to do certain 
tasks as evidence that he was not substantially limited. 
1. Effect of Ability to Work 
Some courts interpreting the ADA have excluded claimants 
because they could perform one major life activity, like working, 
even though they based their coverage on a limitation of another 
major life activity. 145 The Supreme Court stated in Toyota that 
determining "whether an impairment constitutes a disability" should 
not be based only on "the effect of the impairment in the 
workplace." 146 Yet lower courts often consider the work-related 
activities that a claimant can do in granting an employer's motion for 
summary judgment. 147 
The ability to work has often undermined an employee's ADA 
coverage. 148 An extreme example of this focus on the ability to 
perform other activities appeared in the claim of an employee with 
multiple sclerosis (MS), who alleged limitations on her ability to care 
for herself and her family due to fatigue associated with her MS.149 
With only a very short discussion, the court upheld the dismissal of 
her claim on summary judgment because she did not establish a 
limitation on her ability to work, despite the court's agreement "that 
she often experienced the symptoms of [MS] to the extent that she is 
often temporarily unable to function as the average person would." 150 
Similarly, an employee with depression was unable to establish 
ADA coverage despite her presentation of evidence that it "caused 
her difficulty in sleeping and getting along with [others]." 151 The 
court granted summary judgment for the employer because she did 
not show "how these limitations prevented her from performing her 
144. Id. 
145. See, e.g., Lloyd, 288 F. App'x at 789. 
146. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184,201 (2002), superseded by 
statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42,47 U.S.C.). 
147. See, e.g., Lloyd, 288 F. App'x at 789; Littleton, 231 F. App'x at 877. 
148. See Croy v. COBE Labs., Inc., 345 F.3d 1119, 1203-04 (10th Cir. 2003). 
149. Id. at 1204. 
150. Id. 
151. McWilliams v. Jefferson Cnty., 463 F.3d lll3, 1116-17 (lOth Cir. 2006). 
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job 'or that she [was] unable to perform any of the life activities 
completely. '" 152 
Even an obvious major life activity, such as sight, has not been 
considered substantially limited if the person is still able to work. A 
claim by an employee with limited sight in one eye was denied ADA 
coverage in part because he "continued to work in his regularly 
assigned position for nine months" after he suffered the eye injury, 
and he continued to "drive[] a truck ... and passed [a] vision test for 
[his] license.,,153 Similarly, the claim ofa bus driver with asthma was 
dismissed without discussion of limitations on his ability to breathe, 
where the court found that he failed to establish his inability "to 
perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs.,,154 That court 
referenced Toyota's requirement that the impairment interfere with an 
activity that is "of central importance to most people's daily lives." 155 
Thus, these courts focus on the ability to work or perform some other 
tasks as evidence that the person is not substantially limited in any 
major life activity. 
2. Focus on Limitations in some Courts 
In contrast to this focus on abilities, some courts interpreting the 
ADA have refused to dismiss claims based on employees' abilities 
rather than their limitations. 156 When compared to the decisions just 
described, these outcomes illustrate the variance in ADA coverage 
across different circuit courts for claimants who are able to perform 
some tasks associated with major life activities. One illustration of 
152. Id. at 1117 (quoting Croy, 345 F .3d at 1204). 
153. Watson v. Tex. Youth Comm'n, 269 F. App'x 498, 501 (5th Cir. 2008); see also 
EEOC v. United Parcel Servo Inc. 306 F.3d 794, 803 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding driver 
with sight impainnent still able to work); Szmaj V. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 291 F.3d 955, 
956 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding congenital nystagmus causing difficulty in focusing not a 
disability); Foore V. City of Richmond, 6 F. App'x 148, 149 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding 
20/400 vision in right eye with no depth perception not a disability); Tone V. U.S. 
Postal Serv., No. 99-6309,2000 WL 1836764, at *2 (2d Cir. Dec. 13,2000) (holding 
employee who lost eye not substantially limited in major life activity of working); 
Shannon V. New York City Transit Auth., 189 F. Supp. 2d 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(demonstrating employer does not regard employee who can't distinguish colors as 
possessing substantially limiting impainnent) 
154. Wofsy V. Pa1mshores Ret. Comty., 285 F. App'x 631, 633-34 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2G)(3)(i) (2010». 
155. Id. at 633 (citing Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. V. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002), 
superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 
3553 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42,47 U.S.C.». 
156. EEOC V. Chevron Phillips Chern. Co., 570 F.3d 606, 619 (5th Cir. 2009); Emory V. 
Astrazeneca Phann. LP, 401 F.3d 174, 175 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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this more expansive coverage comes from the Third Circuit, which 
reversed the dismissal of a claim of an employee with right-side 
paralysis and difficulties in learning due to cerebral palsy. 157 The 
trial 'court had dismissed the claim because he had graduated from 
high school (in a special education track), worked as a custodian, and 
volunteered in his community in several capacities. 158 
The appellate court stated bluntly that the trial court's reliance on 
what the claimant had "managed to achieve misses the mark."159 His 
ability "to become a productive member of society" was no 
justification for dismissing his ADA claim because he still had 
"significant disability-related obstacles he has overcome" and he still 
had "significantly restricted ability to learn and perform numerous 
manual tasks."160 This appellate court also noted the need for 
individualized inquiry: 
We are mindful of the extraordinarily fact-intensive nature 
of the inquiry; even if two different plaintiffs alleging 
substantial limitations suffer from the same impairment, the 
nuances of its effect on their daily lives will invariably 
manifest themselves in distinct ways. 161 
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit specifically rejected a focus on the 
claimant's ability to work, even though an employee with chronic 
fatigue syndrome was able to perform her job while experiencing the 
symptoms of that impairment. 162 Relying on Toyota, the court held 
that an "assessment of whether an individual is disabled [should be] 
made not just with respect to the workplace, but also by looking at 
the effect of the impairment on the individual's entire life."163 That 
court explained that using a claimant's 
abilities to perform [his or her work duties] as evidence that 
they are not disabled under the ADA would create an 
impossible catch-22 for plaintiffs: 'if their disabilities 
prevented them from doing their jobs altogether they would 
not be qualified individuals for the job under the ADA, and 
157. Emory, 401 F.3dat 175-76. 
158. ld. at 178-79. 
159. Id. at 180. 
160. Id. at 181. 
161. ld. at 182. 
162. EEOC v. Chevron Phillips Chern. Co., 570 F.3d 606, 619 (5th Cir. 2009). 
163. ld. (citing Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, Ky., Inc., 534 U.S. 184, 201 (2002), 
superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 
3553 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42,47 U.S.c.)). 
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if they were able to work through their disabilities they 
would then not be considered disabled. ' 164 
3. ADDAA's Failure to Address Conflict 
445 
The ADAAA does not specifically address the impact of a person's 
ability to engage in some tasks that might involve the major life 
activity relied upon for ADA coverage. 165 The EEOC ADAAA 
regulations state that "[i]n determining whether an individual has a 
disability . . . , the focus is on how a major life activity is 
substantially limited, not on what outcomes an individual can 
achieve.,,166 The regulations provide the example of someone with a 
learning disability who is substantially limited in the major life 
activity of learning, even if he or she has achieved a high level of 
academic success. 167 The Appendix to the EEOC regulations points 
out that a person need not "show that he or she is substantially 
limited in performing all manual tasks" to show a substantial 
limitation on that major life activity. 168 
Despite this explanation, the EEOC regulations do not guarantee 
coverage for a claimant who can perform some tasks that involve a 
major life activity but is still substantially limited in that activity 
because of an inability to perform some tasks associated with that 
activity. 169 The EEOC regulations may not be clear enough to 
resolve the conflict among the circuit courts regarding how the 
remaining abilities of claimants affect their claim that they are 
substantially limited in a major life activity that involve the use of 
those abilities. 170 Courts may continue to conclude that if a claimant 
can engage in tasks, such as working, that involve major life 
164. Id. (citing Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11,24 (1st Cir. 2002)). 
165. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (2010) (defining "substantially limits" but not addressing a 
person's abilities). 
166. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(4)(iii). 
167. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA, as 
Amended, 74 Fed. Reg. 48442 (Sept. 23, 2009). 
168. 29 C.F.R. Part 1630 app. 
169. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA, as 
Amended, 74 Fed. Reg. at 48440. "In determining whether an individual has a 
disability, the focus is on how a major life activity is substantially limited, not on what 
an individual can do in spite of an impairment." ld. 
170. See generally Carreras v. Sajo, Garcia & Partners, 596 F.3d 25, 33-35 (1st Cir. 2010) 
(denying claimant with blurred vision ADA protection and concluding that his 
diabetes was not a substantial limitation on the major life activities of eating and 
seeing because he could drive). 
446 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 40 
activities, the person is not substantially limited in them. 171 Further, 
nothing in the ADAAA or the EEOC regulations directly prevents a 
court from making the factual determination about whether the 
person is substantially limited in a life activity even though he or she 
can perform some tasks that involve that activity. 
B. Duration and Frequency of the Impairment 
Numerous ADA claims have been dismissed without a trial 
because the claimant's impairment was seen as temporary or because 
the impairment was not disabling when it was not "active."l72 
Although the ADA did not specifically address the necessary 
duration of the impairment,173 the EEOC's original regulations stated 
that the impairment should be "permanent or long term" to be 
considered substantially limiting. 174 The Toyota Court excluded 
impairments that only interfered with a major life activity in a minor 
way,175 and reiterated the EEOC's requirement that the impairment 
must be "permanent or long term." 176 
In the ADAAA, Congress rejected the Toyota Court's overall 
narrow definition of disability and specifically stated that an 
impairment should be assessed based on its effects when it is 
active. 177 However, the ADAAA does "not explain how [temporary] 
impairments should be assessed under the actual disability 
definition." 178 The EEOC ADAAA regulations state that "[a]n 
impairment may substantially limit a major life activity even if it 
lasts, or is expected to last, for fewer than six months.,,179 The use of 
the word "may" in the one sentence that addresses this issue may 
keep the door open for courts to find that, at least for some activities, 
a limitation lasting more than six months or even longer is still not 
substantial. In addition, neither the ADAAA nor the EEOC 
regulations address the question of how often an intermittent 
impairment would need to occur to constitute a substantially limiting 
171. Long, supra note 8, at 226. 
172. NCO REpORT, supra note 17, at 61-64. 
173. Id. at 61. 
174. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii}-(iii) (2010). 
175. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002), superseded by 
statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42,47 U.S.c.). 
176. Jd. at 198 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii}-(iii». 
177. Long, supra note 8, at 221-22. 
178. Jd. at 227. 
179. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 48439, 48440 (Sept. 23, 2009). 
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condition. 180 Therefore, disputes about whether an impainnent's 
limitations are substantial because the impainnent is not pennanent 
or long-tenn may continue despite the changes included in the 
ADAAA. 
The EEOC's original ADA regulations provided the following 
factors to consider, in addition to the "nature and severity of the 
impainnent," to detennine whether a "major life activity IS 
substantially limited": 
(ii) The duration or expected duration of the impainnent; 
and 
(iii) The pennanent or long-tenn impact, or the expected 
pennanent or long-tenn impact of or resulting from 
the impainnent. 181 
Similarly, in its Enforcement Guidance, the EEOC elaborated that 
"[ a]n impainnent is substantially limiting if it lasts for more than 
several months and significantly restricts the perfonnance of one or 
more major life activities during that time."182 In contrast to the 
Supreme Court's decisions, the EEOC's ADA compliance manual 
states that if an impainnent lasts "at least several months," it is not 
short tenn. 183 
Some courts have adopted the EEOC's broader definition of 
substantially limited despite a limited duration of an impainnent. For 
example, the Tenth Circuit recognized, prior to Toyota, that an 
impainnent need not be pennanent to be a disability, and held that the 
plaintiff s flexor tenosynovitis could be a disability since "its 
anticipated duration was indefinite, unknowable, or was expected to 
be at least several months.,,184 
The NCD has been critical of these regulations, citing their 
departure from the position of the other agencies that have adopted 
regulations interpreting the other sections of the ADA, which apply 
to public and private services but do not include a duration 
standard. 185 The NCD also has criticized the EEOC for suggesting 
180. See Long, supra note 8, at 227. 
181. 29 C.F.R. § I 630.2(j)(2) (2010). 
182. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND 
PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, EEOC, § 7 (1997), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/psych.html. 
183. SECTION 902 DEFINITION OF THE TERM "DISABILITY", EEOC (2009), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/902cm.html. 
184. Aldrich v. Boeing Co., 146 F.3d 1265, 1270 (10th Cir. 1998). 
185. NCD REpORT, supra note 17, at 60-62; see also 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104, 36.104 (2010). 
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that statutory protection should be denied for an employee when 
recovery is more rapid and the impact on the employer's operations is 
reduced, while providing coverage "if the disruption takes longer" 
and the consequential "burden on the employer is greater.,,186 
Generally, courts have held that the ADA will cover employees 
with conditions that are "potentially long-term, in that their duration 
is indefinite and unknowable,,,187 but not conditions that are brief or 
foreseeably temporary. 188 Subsequent to the Supreme Court's 
holding in Toyota that an impairment must "be permanent or long 
term," 189 appellate court decisions furthered this restrictive 
interpretation to exclude "[ s ]poradic or otherwise temporary 
impairments" from covered substantial limitations. 190 
One lower court has said that in Toyota, the Supreme Court 
extrapolated, "from some estimated numbers of those to be covered, 
that severe restrictions of very important activities were what 
Congress had in mind.,,191 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has held 
that the Toyota Court's inclusion of the severely restricts standard 
established that the threshold for ADA coverage "must remain 
demanding and not be weakened through reference to regulations or 
otherwise." 192 
186. NCD REpORT, supra note 17, at 62. 
187. See, e.g., Santiago Clemente v. Exec. Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 25,31 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(citation omitted). 
188. Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 231, 240-41 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting three month 
leave for chest pains); Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 FJd 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1997) 
(noting five-week leave and four-month activity restriction because of depressive 
attack). 
189. Toyota Motor Mfg. Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002), superseded by 
statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42,47 U.S.c.). 
190. Heiko v. Colombo Sav. Bank, F.S.B., 434 F.3d 249, 257 (4th Cir. 2006); see also 
Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC, 375 F.3d 266, 276 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that 
a employee's trouble with social interactions did not qualify as a disability); Gutridge 
v. Clure, 153 F.3d 898, 901-02 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that inability to work while 
recovering from wrist and elbow surgery did not qualify as a disability under the 
ADA); Heintzelman v. Runyon, 120 F.3d 143, 145 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting that 
temporary back injury not covered); Rogers v. Int'l Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 
755, 759 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that recovery from ankle injury and surgery not 
covered); McDonald v. Pennsylvania, 62 F.3d 92, 96 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that 
recuperation from abdominal surgery not covered). 
191. Guzman-Rosario v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 397 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing 
Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198). 
192. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 801 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Dvorak v. 
Mostardi Platt Assocs., 289 F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
2011J Underwhelming Impact of the ADAA 449 
As the EEOC recommended, a court often takes into account the 
nature, severity, duration, and long-term impact of the impairment. 193 
An impairment is substantially limiting only "if an individual is 
'[sJignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration 
under which. . . the average person in the general population can 
perform that same major life activity. ",194 
The permanency of an impairment may be used by an employer to 
show that a claimant is not otherwise qualified for the position and 
therefore not covered by the ADA. 195 Therefore, an employee or 
applicant must establish that the impairment is not so limiting that he 
or she cannot perform the duties of the position, either with or 
without a reasonable accommodation. 196 But a claimant's 
presentation of information regarding his remaining or improving 
ability to perform the duties of a position could often defeat his ADA 
coverage. 197 For example, an employee with a significant back 
impairment failed to survive a motion for summary judgment even 
though he could not bend or carry heavy weight to perform daily 
tasks. 198 Under Toyota's "demanding standard," the employee's 
admissions regarding his improvement in his abilities prior to the 
alleged discrimination supported the motion for summary judgment 
in favor of the employer, despite medical evidence that he still could 
lift no more than ten to twenty pounds occasionally. 199 
The improvement of an area store supervisor under the Fourth 
Circuit's jurisdiction also defeated her ability to establish her 
disability under the Supreme Court's guidance from Sutton and 
Toyota, despite her limitations on lifting and working hours. 200 Her 
nine-month absence from work due to a back injury was insufficient 
193. Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc., 339 F.3d 682, 685 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 
1630.2(j)(2) (2002); Cooper v. Olin Corp., Winchester Div., 246 F.3d 1083, 1088 (8th 
Cir.2001)). 
194. Moysis v. DTG Datanet, 278 F.3d 819, 825 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 
1630.2(j)(1 )(ii) (2010)). 
195. NCD REpORT, supra note 17, at 65-66. 
196. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)(Supp. III 2009). 
197. Lytes v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 572 F.3d 936, 944 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
198. Id. at 943-44. 
199. Id. at 944 (citing Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002), 
superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 
3553 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42,47 U.S.C.)). 
200. Pollard v. High's of Bait., Inc., 281 F.3d 462, 468 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Toyota, 534 
U.S. at 198; Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (\991), superseded by 
statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42,47 U.S.c.)). 
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in duration to establish a disability, where her medical evidence 
supported the temporary nature of the impairment, even though the 
doctor later determined that she was permanently disabled. 201 This 
case provides an example of how evaluations that indicate 
improvement in an individual's impairment can be used by an 
employer to show that the impairment is only temporary, and 
therefore not substantially limiting. 202 
1. Duration 
Like evidence of improvement in a claimant's condition, the 
limited duration of an impairment has often defeated ADA 
coverage. 203 But courts have varied on how long is long enough to 
establish coverage. Often, if the limitation lasts as long as several 
months but has no lasting effects, then it is treated as "short-term" 
and cannot support ADA coverage. 204 Temporary conditions like 
broken bones or a temporary lifting restriction typically do not 
support ADA coverage. 205 Similarly, temporary mental health 
impairments lasting a short period of time generally do not provide 
for ADA coverage. 206 
Some courts have denied ADA coverage even if a claim meets the 
EEOC's "several month" rule. 207 For example, the Eighth Circuit 
dismissed the claim of a teacher whose impairments were expected to 
last six months, even though they had already lasted for 
approximately four months. 208 
201. ld. at 469. 
202. Jd. (citing Mellon v. Fed. Express Corp., 239 F.3d 954, 956-57 (8th Cir. 2001); 
Heintzelman v. Runyon, 120 F.3d 143, 145 (8th Cir. 1997)); see also Brunker v. 
Schwan's Home Servo Inc., 583 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that employee 
not covered where symptoms of MS were decreasing); Sanchez-Figueroa V. Banco 
Popular De P.R., 527 F.3d 209, 215 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that good prognosis for 
situational disorder defeated ADA coverage). 
203. Fram, supra note 3, at 210. 
204. ld. 
205. See Vierra V. Wayne Mem'l Hosp., 168 F. App'x 492, 496 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that 
broken finger requiring a splint for one month not permanent or long-term); Velarde 
V. Associated Reg'l & Univ. Pathologists, 61 F. App'x 627, 630 (lOth Cir. 2003) 
(noting that lifting impairment for less than two months not long-term). 
206. Oblas V. Am. Home Assurance Co., No. 98-9350, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23371, at 
*4 (2d Cir. Sept. 24, 1999) (noting that one-month depression not a disability because 
oflack of sufficient duration). 
207. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND 
PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, supra note 182, § 7. 
208. Samuels V. Kan. City Sch. Dist., 437 F.3d 797, 802 (8th Cir. 2006). Interestingly, the 
court denied a subsequent workers' compensation evaluation that she suffered a 60% 
permanent partial disability of her body as a whole. ld. at 802. 
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Similarly, the First Circuit dismissed the claim of an employee 
suffering from ovarian cysts for a period of at least seven months. 209 
Referencing Toyota, the court explained that a condition must last for 
more than "several months," which had been the First Circuit's 
previous standard. 210 The court instead suggested that the condition 
must last from six to twenty-four months but implied that more 
severe impairments might be covered even if they lasted for a shorter 
period. 21 I 
Some courts have been much less demanding in their requirement 
of permanency. 212 These courts tend to directly reference the EEOC 
guidelines. For example, the EEOC guidance has justified 
determining whether a limitation that is substantial is measured in 
terms of months, not years, when considering a limitation on the 
ability to sleep.2\3 Similarly, a police officer who suffered from 
major depression for about two years as an employee and at least an 
additional year thereafter survived a motion for summary 
judgment. 214 This conclusion was based in part on medical testimony 
that his condition was recurrent and "severe, would a have long-term 
impact, and was likely to persist.,,215 Compared to the cases 
discussed earlier, which required a longer and more definite duration, 
these cases illustrate the variation in how long is long enough for a 
non-permanent impairment to establish ADA coverage. 216 
2. Continuous Effect 
Substantial limitation may also be lacking where a claimant is not 
continuously affected by the impairment. Prior to the ADAAA, 
courts often dismissed the claim of an employee or applicant with a 
chronic condition because the effects of that condition did not occur 
often enough.217 For example, an employee with chronic pancreatitis 
209. Guzman-Rosario v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 397 F.3d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 2005). 
210. Jd. at 10. 
211. See id. 
212. See Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 765 (3rd Cir. 2004). 
213. Desmond v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 944, 958 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
214. Williams, 380 F.3d at 755-56. 
215. Id. at 765. 
216. Compare Samuels v. Kan. City Mo. Sch. Dist., 437 F.3d 797, 802 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(dismissing a claim for an extremity disability expected to last six months), and 
Guzmim-Rosario, 397 F.3d at 8 (dismissing a claim for ovarian cysts expected to last 
at least seven months), with Desmond, 530 F.3d at 957 (surviving summary judgment 
for a sleep disorder lasting five months), and Williams, 380 F.3d at 765 (surviving 
summary judgment for a depression disorder lasting two years). 
217. See Waldrip v. Gen. Elec. Co., 325 F.3d 652, 656 (5th Cir. 2003). 
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that caused him to miss a few days of work when his condition 
"flared up" was not covered by the ADA, because "such temporary 
effects do not amount to a substantiallimitation.,,218 
Similarly, a brittle-diabetic employee was unable to show that she 
was substantially impaired in the ability to care for herself or think, 
even though when she was "unsuccessful in attaining a proper blood 
sugar level, she [could not] properly care for herself' or think 
clearly.219 She failed to present "evidence that she [was] so 
unsuccessful in monitoring her blood sugar levels that she [was] 
substantially limited in caring for herself' or in her ability to think. 220 
Likewise, another diabetic employee was not entitled to ADA 
coverage based on a limitation on his sight, despite frequent episodes 
of blurred vision, because he was still able to engage in routine daily 
activities that required sight. 221 The court failed to specify whether 
he could perform these activities when he was experiencing the 
blurred vision. 222 
Even the inability to continue working on a regular basis still was 
not always enough to establish ADA coverage based on an 
intermittent condition. For example, an employee with ADHD and 
depression was unable to establish a substantial limitation, despite 
numerous problems at work that both he and his psychologist 
attributed to his ADHD.223 The record lacked evidence that the 
plaintiff "could not perform some usual activity compared with the 
general population, or that he had a continuing inability to handle 
stress at all times, rather than only episodically."224 The failure to 
establish ADA coverage based on the inability to work in these 
situations contrasts sharply with the cases discussed earlier, where the 
ability to work was relied upon to deny ADA coverage. 225 
In contrast to those claims that were dismissed due to the 
temporary or episodic nature of the impairment, some courts 
recognized even before the ADAAA's passage that employees with 
218. Idat656-57. 
219. Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003). 
220. ld at 1043. 
221. Carreras v. Sajo, Garcia & Partners, 596 F.3d 25,34 (Ist Cir. 2010); see also Turner 
v. Saloon Ltd., 595 F.3d 679, 689 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that employee not covered 
where psoriasis only occasionally limited ability to walk). . 
222. See Carreras, 596 F.3d at 34. 
223. Calefv. Gillette Co., 322 F.3d 75, 80-84 (Ist Cir. 2003). 
224. ld at 86; see also Corley v. Dep't of Veterans' Affairs, 218 F. App'x 727,735 (10th 
Cir. 2007) (noting that monthly seizures insufficient to establish Rehabilitation Act 
coverage). 
225. Aldrich v. Boeing Co., 146 F.3d 1265, 1271 (10th Cir. 1998). 
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episodic conditions could be covered. 226 Yet these claimants may 
have been successful because their symptoms occurred often enough. 
For example, an employee with end-stage renal disease was able to 
show that his condition was sufficiently persistent to be substantially 
limiting, where to accomplish the equivalent of urination, he needed 
to use a dialysis machine three afternoons per week. 227 The court also 
relied on the fact that at all times relevant to the claim, he was 
restricted in his ability to urinate. 228 
Similarly, an employee with chronic fatigue syndrome, which was 
intermittent and temporary in its effects, was still able to survive a 
motion for summary judgment. 229 This ADA coverage was based on 
her testimony that her cognitive deficits occurred daily (even though 
she could perform some tasks during these periods) and she suffered 
"headaches at least three times a week and low-grade fevers in the 
afternoons.,,230 The appellate court found that she submitted 
sufficient evidence of limitations on her ability to care for herself 
based on her inability to shower regularly"cook, shop for food, zip up 
her own clothes, or even use the bathroom without her sister's 
assistance.,,231 The court concluded that the indefinite nature of her 
impairment did not defeat her claim, even though she had gone 
fifteen years without symptoms before her relapse, because her 
chronic fatigue was more like epilepsy or MS than a temporary 
condition like a broken limb or influenza. 232 
Some claimants have been successful in showing a substantial 
limitation even if their conditions affected them less frequently. Yet 
the courts still rely heavily on how often these "flare ups" occur. For 
example, an employee with psoriasis and psoriatic arthritis presented 
evidence to support the jury's verdict in his favor regarding ADA 
226. See, e.g., EEOC v. Chevron Phillips Chern. Co., 570 F.3d 606, 618 (5th Cir. 2009) 
("Many courts have recognized that relapsing-remitting conditions like multiple 
sclerosis, epilepsy, or colitis can constitute ADA disabilities depending on the nature 
of each individual case."). 
227. Heiko v. Colombo Say. Bank, F.S.B., 434 F.3d 259, 251-52 (4th Cir. 2006). 
228. Id. at 257. 
229. Chevron Phillips Chern. Co., 570 F.3d at 615-16. 
230. Id. at 609, 612. 
231. ld. at 617 (citing Desmond v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 944, 956 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Fenney 
v. Dakota, Minn. & E. R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 715 (8th Cir. 2003); EEOC v. United 
Parcel Serv., 249 F.3d 557,562-63 (6th Cir. 2001); McAlindin v. Cnty. of San Diego, 
192 F.3d 1226, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999)). . 
232. ld. at 618-19 (citing Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer's Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 780 
(6th Cir. 1998); Ryan v. Grae & Rybicki, 135 F.3d 867, 871-72 (2d Cir. 1998); Zande 
V. State orWis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538,544 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
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coverage, even though his condition was episodic. 233 This employee 
established a substantial limitation on his ability to walk during times 
when his condition flared up. 234 The Fifth Circuit distinguished 
another of its decisions that denied ADA coverage under the 
proposition that an intermittent "flare up" cannot support ADA 
coverage because that case involved a plaintiff who only occasionally 
missed a few days of work due to his condition, described as "few 
and far between" by the COurt. 235 This employee, in contrast, "spen[ t] 
anywhere from about one-third to about one-half of each month 
unable to [walk] without [excruciating] pain.,,236 His ability to work 
during flare-ups did not undermine his ADA coverage, because he sat 
and stood to perform his work, and he based coverage on an inability 
to walk. 237 
3. Limited Effect of ADAAA 
The ADAAA states that "[a]n impairment that is episodic or in 
remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life 
activity when active.,,238 In addition, the EEOC's regulations under 
the ADAAA state that "[a]n impairment may substantially limit a 
major life activity even if it lasts, or is expected to last, for fewer than 
six months.,,239 The EEOC declined to insert a six-month 
requirement explaining that, "impairments that last on~ a short 
period of time may be covered if sufficiently severe.,,24 But the 
EEOC also declined to specify how long is long enough to establish a 
substantial limitation. 
This limited guidance may be insufficient to address the question of 
"how long is long enough" and the variations in approaching the 
question of an intermittent condition, as demonstrated by the 
decisions outlined above. The ADAAA is clear that a person with a 
chronic condition can establish ADA coverage based on the extent of 
the limitations at the time the condition is "active.,,241 However, 
neither the ADAAA nor the EEOC regulations directly address how 
233. Carmona v. Sw. Airlines Co., 604 F.3d 848, 859 (5th Cir. 2010). 
234. Id. at 857,859. 
235. Id. at 858 (citing Waldrip v. Gen. Elec. Co., 325 F.3d 652, 652, 657 (5th Cir. 2003». 
236. Id. at 851. 
237. Id. at 858. 
238. 42 U.S.C. §12102(4)(D) (Supp. II 2009). 
239. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA, as 
Amended, 74 Fed. Reg. 48431,48440 (Sept. 23, 2009). 
240. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 Summary. 
241. 42 U.S.c. § 12102(4)(D) (Supp. II 2009). 
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often the chronic condition must be active to establish ADA 
coverage. 
As with the ability to perform some activities, the limited duration 
or sporadic nature of an impairment may continue to be relied upon 
by a court to dismiss a claim on summary judgment. This may be 
inappropriate given the heavily factual nature of the determination of 
how long or how often is enough to be substantially limiting. The 
expectation of a specific time period or frequency to support a claim 
also conflicts with direction from the Supreme Court that claimants 
deserve an individualized inquiry into whether their impairment is 
substantially limiting for them.242 
Second, specific guidance is provided by the definition section's 
statement that an impairment that is episodic or in remission qualifies 
as a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity in its 
active state. 243 In claims by a person whose condition is in remission, 
coverage now depends on "whether the disease would substantially 
limit a major life activity in its active phase, regardless of whether the 
disease has a significant effect on the employee while in 
remission.,,244 This amendment "represents a subtle, but fairly 
substantial change in meaning.,,245 This section should address the 
disparity among courts regarding whether an impairment that is 
episodic is substantial enough to support ADA coverage. 246 Yet the 
courts still do not have guidance on how long the effects of an 
impairment need to last, or how often an intermittent condition needs 
to occur, for the impairment to be substantially limiting. 
Despite this limited guidance on intermittent conditions, the 
ADAAA failed to even reference certain controversial issues 
regarding the specific length of time that a condition must continue to 
support ADA coverage. This clarification was omitted despite the 
history of conflicting decisions regarding the length of time an 
impairment must last to support coverage. 247 The Amendments only 
state that an individual should not be covered as "regarded as" 
242. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. 
243. 42 U.s.c. § 12102(4)(D). 
244. Philip A. Kilgore & John T. Merrell, Redefining "Disabled": The ADA Amendments 
Act 012008,21 S.C. LAW. 24,26 (2009). 
245. Long, supra note 8, at 221. 
246. See inlra Part IV.B. 
247. Compare Aldrich v. Boeing Co., 146 F.3d 1265, 1270 (10th Cir. 1998) (recognizing 
flexor tenosynovitis as a substantial limitation although the duration of the impairment 
was unknown), with Guzman-Rosario v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 397 F.3d 6, 8-10 
(1st Cir. 2005) (rejecting ovarian cysts over a seven month period as a substantially 
limiting impairment). 
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disabled if the condition is minor and lasts for less than six months. 248 
Given the House of Representatives Committee on Education and 
Labor Report's statement that this six-month rule does not apply to 
actual disabilities, actual impairments lasting even less than six 
months arguably could provide for ADA coverage. 249 
C. Comparison to the General Population 
The interpretation of "substantially limits" has been significantly 
influenced by the comparison of a person's limitations and remaining 
abilities to the abilities of members of the general population. 250 
Nothing in the original ADA required this comparison. 251 The EEOC 
suggested in its original regulations that the coverage of the ADA 
depends on a comparison between the effects of the employee's 
impairment and the abilities of the average person in the general 
population. 252 Even though many claims have been dismissed for 
failure to present sufficient evidence of how a claimant's abilities 
compare to those of the general popUlation, little academic 
commentary on the ADA focuses on this "average person" 
requirement. 253 
The comparison to members of the general popUlation relates back 
to the emphasis of both the EEOC and the Supreme Court on 
individualized inquiry into the claimant's limitations. 254 Yet courts 
have used this case-by-case assessment to dismiss claims based on 
how incompetent the average person is by comparison. 255 This has 
meant that someone with a "debilitating impairment [but] with more 
education or training than the 'average person' may not be disabled 
enough. ,,256 
Using this approach, some "courts examine how a person functions 
generally and essentially compare disabled people with 'normal' 
ones. ,,257 This has resulted, at times, in disabled persons lacking the 
protection of the ADA, often based on evidence presented to show 
248. Long, supra note 8, at 224 (citing 42 u.s.c. § 12102(3)(B». 
249. H.R. REp. No. 110-730 at 3, 24-25 (2008). 
250. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2010). 
251. 42 u.s.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2006) (using the tenn "substantially limits" in the definition 
of disability, but not expressly providing guidance for interpreting the tenn). 
252. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1). 
253. Anderson, supra note 100, at 411 & n.6; see also PETER BLANCK ET AL., DISABILITY 
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND POLICY § 3.2(B)(1) (2004) (emphasizing the importance of 
individualized inquiry). 
254. BLANCKET AL., supra note 253, § 3.2(B)(1). 
255. Anderson, supra note 100, at 411. 
256. O'Brien, supra note 33, at 50. 
257. Id. (alteration in original). 
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that they are "qualified" to perform the duties of their job.258 Courts 
have also had a tendency to compare the limitations of the claimant at 
hand with other ADA plaintiffs who had similar limitations, using 
that previous court's determination that the earlier plaintiff was not 
more limited than members of the general population. 259 Thus, a 
plaintiff who fails to present sufficient evidence on how her 
limitations compare to the those of the general population will find 
her claim dismissed on a motion for summary judgment, unless she is 
"more disabled" than other plaintiffs who have come before her. 260 
Even though the Toyota Court referenced the EEOC regulations for 
some purposes and agreed that an individualized inquiry is 
appropriate, the Court did not accept the EEOC's approach of 
comparing an employee's ability with the abilities of others. 261 The 
Toyota Court focused instead on the "'large potential differences in 
the severity and duration of the effects'" of certain impairments on 
"the major life activity of performing manual tasks.,,262 However, 
this has not stopped lower courts from making this comparison to 
members of the general population on a motion for summary 
judgment. 263 
Because substantial limitation is a subjective standard, its definition 
is subject to '''social influences on what one recognizes as significant 
life activities and a 'substantial limit[ation]' of those activities. ",264 
Therefore, a judgment call must be made regarding what is different 
258. See, e.g., Taylor v. Fed. Express Corp., 429 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2005). 
259. Anderson, supra note 100, at 439 & 439-40 n.165. 
260. See Nuzum v. Ozark Auto. Distribs., Inc., 432 F.3d 839, 847-50 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(comparing claimant's lifting restrictions to those of the claimant in Webner v. Titan 
Distrib., Inc., 267 F.3d 828 (8th Cir. 2001), to find insufficient demonstration of 
substantial limitation on the major life activity of working). 
261. Vance, supra note 115, at 508. 
262. Id. (quoting Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196, 199 (2002), 
superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 
3553 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42,47 U.S.C.)). 
263. See, e.g., Livingston v. Fred Meyer Stories, Inc., 388 F. App'x 738, 740 (9th Cir. 
2010); Desmond v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 944, 954--55 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Nadler v. 
Harvey, No. 06-12692, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 20272, at *18-19 (lIth Cir. Aug. 24, 
2007); Capobianco v. City of N.Y., 422 F.3d 47, 60 (2d Cir. 2005); Rohan v. 
Networks Presentations LLC, 375 F.3d 266, 274--75 (4th Cir. 2004); Heisler v. Metro. 
Council, 339 F.3d 622, 627-28 (8th Cir. 2003). 
264. Anderson, supra note 100, at 414 (alteration in original) (quoting Ani B. Satz, A 
Jurisprudence of Dysfunction: On the Role of "Normal Species Functioning" in 
Disability Analysis, 6 Y ALEJ. HEALTH POL'y L. & ETHICS 221, 252 (2006)). 
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enough to be "a significant deviation from" average human 
experience. 265 
Under the ADA, some courts have been more than willing to make 
that judgment call by comparing the claimant's abilities to members 
of the general population. 266 Particularly when considering the 
abilities of the general population, courts should instead recognize 
that the jury is in a better position to make that comparison. 267 
Members of the jury are "[t]he best judge[s] of whether the 
experiences of an individual are outside the norm.,,268 Professor 
Cheryl Anderson, went so far as to say "fj]ury common sense is 
preferable to judge-made common sense when the issue is one of 
common experience.,,269 
Despite the jury's role, courts have often made those factual 
determinations to support the exclusion of a claimant from the 
ADA's coverage. 270 
The high-incidence of dismissal of claims based on a claimant's 
failure to make an influential comparison to the limitations of the 
general population, or based on the court's comparison to other ADA 
plaintiffs, illustrates the difficulties faced by claimants under the 
ADA. 
1. Some Life Activities Often Compared 
Some major life activities seem particularly susceptible to a court 
requiring the comparison to the claimant's abilities to those of the 
general population. For the activity of sleeping, commonly relied 
upon by ADA claimants, it has been difficult for an employee 
claiming a disability to show that disruption of their sleep is 
significant, particularly if the employee fails to compare herself to the 
general population.271 For example, an employee with depression 
was unable to establish ADA coverage based on her lack of sleep, 
even though her medical records reflected that she had disturbed 
265. Id. 
266. Id. at 477. 
267. Id. 
268. Id. 
269. Id. 
270. For example, one claim based on an inability to interact with others was dismissed, in 
part based on the court's conclusions regarding the cause of the employee's limited 
interactions with her family, and its interpretation of facts showing that she had made 
friends at work. Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC, 375 FJd 266, 275-76 (4th 
Cir. 2004). 
271. See Heisler v. Metro. Council, 339 F.3d 622, 628 (8th Cir. 2003). 
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sleep, was diagnosed with sleep apnea, and was taking medication to 
help her sleep. 272 
This court concluded that her testimony did not explain the severity 
of her sleep apnea compared to others in the general population. 273 
Similarly, she failed to establish a limitation on her ability to 
concentrate based on her conclusory statements that she had 
difficulty concentrating, in part because she did not compare herself 
to the general population. 274 
Even when a comparison to others is made, a sleep-deprived 
employee may not be substantially limited according to many 
courts. 275 Often employees have been unable to establish a disability 
based on a lack of sleep because difficulty in sleeping is widespread 
among those who do not have a disability. 276 To establish a 
substantial limitation in the ability to sleep, a claimant must present 
evidence that his or her inability to sleep is more severe than that of 
"the average person in the general population. ,,277 
In contrast to these uncovered employees, other employees have 
been able to show a substantial limitation on sleep activity based on 
either a comparison to others or to the claimant's past behavior. 278 
Testimony by one employee that he was sleeping an average of three 
to five hours per night and then later only two to four hours each 
night was sufficient for ADA coverage, in light of the fact that after 
leaving his employment, he received approximately six hours of sleep 
per night. 279 The court noted the lack of medical or expert testimony 
regarding his sleeplessness but referenced the guidance that '" a 
plaintiff's personal testimony cannot be inadequate to raise a genuine 
272. Id. at 627-28. 
273. Id. at 628. 
274. Id. at 629. 
275. See, e.g., Nuzum v. Ozark Auto. Distribs., Inc., 432 F.3d 839, 848 (8th Cir. 2005) ("It 
has been held as a matter of law that inability to sleep for more than five hours per 
night is not a substantial limitation on the major life activity of sleeping."). 
276. See, e.g., Nadler v. Harvey, No. 06-12692, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 20272, at *18-19 
(lIth Cir. Aug. 24, 2007) (quoting Rossbach v. City of Miami, 371 F.3d 1354, 1358 
(11 th Cir. 2004)); Colwell v. Suffolk Cnty. Police Dep't, 158 F.3d 635, 644 (2d Cir. 
1998). 
277. See Nuzum, 432 F.3d at 848 (sleeping patterns of two-and-a-half hours at a time and 
five hours a night failed to constitute a substantial impairment for lack of 
demonstrated significant difference from general population). 
278. Desmond v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 944, 955-56 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Head v. Glacier Nw., 
Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that five to six hours of sleep is 
enough to raise a genuine issue of material fact). 
279. Desmond, 530 F.3d at 955-56. 
460 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 40 
issue regarding his own experience. ",280 This lack of medical 
testimony may have been compensated by the employee's 
comparison of himself to "'the average person in the general 
population, '" based on "a study showing that [71 %] of adults get five 
to eight hours of sleep per night," which was not contradicted. 281 
Vision is another major life activity for which employees have been 
required to compare the limitations on their sight to the average 
person in the general population. 282 A court reviewing the claims of 
several applicants for driving positions with UPS held "that for a 
monocular individual to show that his impairment is a disability, the 
impairment must prevent or severely restrict use of his eyesight 
compared with how unimpaired individuals normally use their 
eyesight in daily life. ,,283 This court explained that "it does not follow 
that seeing as a whole is substantially limited just because the 
individual has a deficiency in some aspect of vision.,,284 These 
applicants failed to present sufficient evidence regarding how their 
vision compared to the average person in the general population. 285 
Like the sleep-deprived claimant above, who relied on information 
about the abilities of the general population, a sanitation worker with 
night blindness was able to survive a motion for summary judgment 
based on the rarity of his condition. 286 One of his medical experts 
offered evidence that his condition of congenital stationary night 
blindness affected only one in ten thousand, and that he required 
"more than 100 times as much light to see as a normally-sighted 
person.,,287 He also offered "evidence that [his] night blindness 
prevent[ ed] him from driving at night or in dim light," which helped 
determine the extent of his limitation on seeing in general and in 
holding jobs that required driving at night. 288 The court referred the 
claim to a jury, which was free to conclude that an "'average person 
in the general population' can drive at night.,,289 
More recently, the Ninth Circuit similarly held that a person whose 
visual impairment affected her ability to walk and drive safely after 
dark raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was a 
280. Id. at 956 (quoting Haynes v. Williams, 392 F.3d 478, 482 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). 
281. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R § 1630.2G)(l) (2010)). 
282. See, e.g., EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 306 F.3d 794, 802 (9th Cir. 2002). 
283. Id. 
284. ld. at 803. 
285. Id. 
286. Capobianco v. City of New York, 422 F.3d 47,53,58 (2d Cir. 2005). 
287. Id. at 53. 
288. Id. at 58. 
289. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(I)(ii) (2010)). 
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person with a disability under the ADA. 290 The court reversed the 
trial court's dismissal of the claim on summary judgment under the 
EEOC's regulations because the average person can safely drive and 
walk at night. 291 
These cases demonstrate the different approaches by courts with 
regard to evidence about the abilities of the general population 
compared to the claimant's limitations. Some claims are dismissed 
without such a comparison, even on a motion for summary judgment, 
while other courts, including the Ninth and Second Circuits, will 
allow a jury to use its common sense or general information about 
what people typically are able to do so as to make a determination on 
the ADA's coverage. 292 
2. Overall Success Leads to Denial of Claims 
A claimant may be denied ADA coverage despite significant 
limitations on a major life activity if the claimant is still able to be 
relatively successful, compared to the achievements of members of 
the general population.293 This is similar to a court's focus on the 
person's abilities rather than on the extent of their limitations, as 
discussed in Part lILA of this article. Courts will consider the 
abilities of the claimant and make a comparison to abilities that are 
generally found in others, rather than asking whether this person is 
more or less limited than others who have similar training and 
education. 294 
This approach makes it extremely difficult for a well-educated or 
well-trained person to gain ADA coverage. For example, an 
employee with ADHD and depression was unable to establish that 
these impairments substantially affected his ability to learn, 
compared to the general population. 295 The fact that "he found 
certain subjects or educational contexts challenging or frustrating" 
was not enough to defeat summary judgment, where he had 
"graduated from high school, successfully completed the first two 
years of the Program, passed seven of seventeen tests [in the 
290. See Livingston v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 388 F. App'x 738, 740-42 (9th Cir. 2010). 
291. Id. 
292. See, e.g., Livingston, 388 F. App'x at 742; Capobianco, 422 F.3d at 58. 
293. See generally Ristrom v. Asbestos Workers Local 34 Joint Apprentice Comm., 370 
F.3d 763, 769-70 (8th Cir. 2004); Leisen v. City of Shelbyville, 153 F.3d 805, 806, 
808 (7th Cir. 1998) (both noting that an inability to complete advanced training does 
not show that a plaintiff is substantially limited in the major life activity of learning). 
294. See Ristrom, 370 F.3d at 769-70. 
295. Id. at 769. 
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Program], and held a full-time job.,,296 The court dismissed the claim 
based on the lack of evidence on how the average person in the 
general population would perform in the highly specialized courses 
the claimant was taking. 297 
By comparing a claimant to anyone in the general population rather 
than a person with comparable training or skills, the courts are failing 
to make an individualized inquiry, as suggested by the Supreme 
Court and the EEOC. 298 Moreover, the courts are ignoring the effects 
of the impairment on that particular claimant, who might need more 
than average abilities to continue to function both at home and at 
work. Such a comparison also fails to recognize the difference 
between that particular claimant's abilities before and after the onset 
of their impairment. 
3. Claimants Compared to Prior Plaintiffs Rather than "General 
Population" 
Even though courts may recognize the notion of comparing a 
claimant to members of the general population, they often conduct 
such a comparison by measuring the abilities of an employee 
asserting coverage under the ADA against other plaintiffs who have 
come before them. 299 This is an easy way for courts to support the 
dismissal of an ADA claim on summary judgment. 300 However, 
comparison to a few other plaintiffs does not equate with 
consideration of the abilities of members of the general population. 
At most, the second court is relying on the first court's comparison of 
the first plaintiffs abilities to those of the general population. In 
addition, reliance on such comparison across types of disabilities and 
personal, work, and home situations flies in the face of the 
296. Jd. 
297. Id. at 770. 
298. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002), superseded by 
statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42, 47 U.S.C.); 29 C.F.R. § 
1630.2U)(3)(i) (2010). 
299. See, e.g., Simpson v. Vanderbilt Univ., 359 F. App'x 562, 567 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing 
Squibb v. Mem'l Med. Ctr., 497 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir. 2007); Greathouse v. 
Westfall, 212 F. App'x 379, 383 (6th Cir. 2006); Swanson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 268 
F.3d 307, 316-17 (6th Cir. 2001); Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300, 1306 (lOth 
Cir. 1999)) (noting that where a plaintiff urged the court to consider his sleep 
deprivation as a disability, the court looked to the abilities of other plaintiffs in similar 
cases and compared their holdings). 
300. Jennifer Gozdowski Brown, Comment, Mitigating Measures and the ADA after 
Sutton: Can Employers Limit our Ability to Care for Ourselves in the Workplace?, 7 
1. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 113, 129-30 (2003). 
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requirement of the Supreme Court and the suggestion of the EEOC 
that courts conduct an individualized assessment of a person's 
coverage. 301 
In making a comparison to the abilities of the general population, 
courts hearing claims based on an inability to sleep commonly have 
compared the limitations of the claimant in question to past plaintiffs 
to find that the current claimant is not covered by the ADA.302 For 
example, an employee who could not sleep more than five hours per 
night and whose sleep was not restful due to his eczema was not 
covered by the ADA based in part on a comparison to one other 
plaintiff who was not covered by the ADA despite an inability to 
sleep more than five hours. 303 
This same employee also failed to show a substantial limitation on 
his ability to care for himself, despite his testimony regarding his 
limitations in cleaning and dressing himself, when found to be less 
impaired than one other plaintiff with psoriasis and a second plaintiff 
with allergies in another unpublished case. 304 Using the same 
methodology, the court compared the limitations on his ability to 
think due to his eczema to those of a plaintiff with a mental illness 
that affected memory and focus, despite the former's testimony that 
the impairment was so distracting that his cognitive processes were 
impaired. 305 
As that case illustrates, courts often make cross-case comparisons 
even if the impairments are completely different. Courts also do not 
seem concerned that the circumstances of an individual claimant may 
make a condition more limiting, disregarding the emphasis of the 
301. See Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 231,240 (Ist Cir. 2002) (citing Lebron-Torres v. 
Whitehall Labs., 251 F.3d 236, 241 (1st Cir. 2001); Santiago Clemente v. Exec. 
Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 25, 32-33 (Ist Cir. 2000); Siemon v. AT&T Corp., 117 F.3d 
1173, 1176 (lOth Cir. 1997)) (comparing plaintiff's ability to proffer evidence of jobs 
he can perform while having a heart condition with abilities of prior plaintiffs with 
hearing loss, back conditions, and depression); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2U)(I)(ii). 
302. See infra note 309. 
303. Verhoff v. Time Warner Cable Inc., 299 F. App'x. 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing 
Swanson, 268 F.3d at 314). 
304. Id. at 493 (citing Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer's Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 781 
(6th Cir. 1998); Cantrell v. Nashville Elec. Serv., No. 97-5839, 1999 WL 68571, at *3 
(6th Cir. Jan. 23,1999)). 
305. Id. (citing Head v. Glacier Nw., Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2005)); see also 
EEOC v. Chevron Phillips Chern. Co., 570 F.3d 606, 617 (5th Cir. 2009) (comparing 
claimant's limitations to other plaintiffs with different impairments but who had 
similar limitations). 
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Supreme Court and the EEOC on individualized inquiry. 306 In 
addition, these comparisons do not consider the claimant's previous 
abilities as a point of reference for determining if the impairment has 
limited those abilities. 307 
Instead, this comparison to other plaintiffs seems to hold more 
weight than a comparison to the claimant's previous abilities prior to 
the onset of his or her impairment.308 For example, an employee's 
testimony that "he slept fewer hours than he felt he needed" was 
disregarded in light of evidence that his average amount of sleep was 
greater than the sleep average for other plaintiffs who had been found 
to lack the coverage of the ADA by other courtS. 309 This comparison 
to other ADA plaintiffs was more influential for the court than the 
employee's medical testimony that his "condition 'substantially 
limited his sleep activity compared to the normal population, '" and 
the health care provider's opinion that the claimant was "suffering 'a 
severe sleep disorder, '" which was relegated to a footnote. 310 At the 
same time, this court noted that assessment "'must be made on a 
case-by-case basis. ",311 
Learning difficulties have also been compared across plaintiffs to 
support a motion for summary judgment finding no ADA 
coverage. 312 For example, the Eighth Circuit compared the 
limitations of a person with learning difficulties because of his 
ADHD and depression to another plaintiff who was unable to 
establish ADA coverage based on her emotional impairments that 
prevented her from passing a few highly specialized courses. 313 Both 
plaintiffs had difficulty passing examinations for their respective 
306. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002), superseded by 
statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42,47 U.S.C.); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j). 
307. See Fredricksen v. United Parcel Serv., Co., 581 F.3d 516, 521-22 (7th Cir. 2009). 
308. See id. at 522. 
309. Nadler v. Harvey, No. 06-12692, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 20272, at *20 (11th Cir. 
Aug. 24, 2007); see also Simpson v. Vanderbilt Univ., 359 F. App'x 562, 564, 566--67 
(6th Cir. 2009) (citing Squibb v. Mem'l Med. Ctr., 497 F.3d 775,784 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(noting that unsupported assertions about amount of sleep are insufficient); 
Greathouse v. Westfall, 212 F. App'x 379, 383 (6th Cir. 2006) (dismissing the case 
based on only general statements from the plaintiff and his doctors about his sleep 
problems); Boerst v. Gen. Mills Operations, Inc., 25 F. App'x 403, 407 (6th Cir. 
2002». 
310. Nadler, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 20272 at *21 & n.7. 
31l. Id. at *21 n.7 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. (2011». 
312. Ristrom v. Asbestos Workers Loca134 Joint Apprentice Comm., 370 F.3d 763, 770-
71 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Leisen v. City of Shelbyville, 153 F.3d 805, 806--08 (7th 
Cir. 1998». 
313. Id. (citing Leisen, 153 F.3d at 806--08). 
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professions, but their conditions and the requirements of the 
examinations were completely different. 314 
Courts have even made more specific comparisons across 
plaintiffs. In deciding that Dawn Holt, an employee of a mental 
health clinic, was not substantially limited in performing manual 
tasks despite the limitations caused by her cerebral palsy, the 
appellate court compared her limitations in eating and caring for 
herself to other plaintiffs who were "restricted from doing a few 
specific tasks, but can otherwise perform a variety of manual 
activities.,,315 The court also compared her to other plaintiffs whose 
impairment restricted them from performing a wider range of manual 
tasks. 316 Despite her personal testimony that she needed help "when 
chopping, cutting, and slicing food" and cutting her nails, the court 
dismissed her claim, concluding that "a rational jury could not find 
[that she] is substantially limited in her ability to perform manual 
tasks.,,317 
A comparison of the current claimant to previous ADA claims can 
continue back for several generations of cases. For example, the 
comparison across plaintiffs continued beyond Ms. Holt, described 
above. 318 A year after that decision, the same court compared an 
employee with MS to Ms. Holt. 319 The court concluded that the 
employee with MS was likewise not disabled, because she could 
perform manual tasks "given sufficient rest," and could rely on her 
family members to perform some tasks, even though she had testified 
that she was frequently unable to perform several life activities, such 
as lifting and performing household chores, because of her fatigue. 320 
This comparison across plaintiffs also has been used to deny 
coverage of claimants who base ADA claims on restrictions on an 
ability to work. For example, a registered nurse with a back 
condition that limited her abilities to lift and stand could not establish 
a substantial limitation of her ability to work, despite her testimony 
that she could not perform any nursing jobs that involved patient 
314. ld. 
315. Holt v. Grand Lake Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 443 F.3d 762,763,766 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(citing Thornton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 261 F.3d 7S9, 797 (9th Cir. 2001); 
Chanda v. Engelhard/ICC, 234 F.3d 1219, 1223 (11th Cir. 2000)). 
316. Jd. at 766 (citing Emory v. AstraZeneca Pharms. LP, 401 F.3d 174, lSI (3d Cir. 
2005)). 
317. ld. at 767. 
31S. Berry v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 490 F.3d 1211, 121S (lOth Cir. 2007) (citing Holt, 443 
F.3d at 767). 
319. ld. at 1215, 121S. 
320. Jd. at 121S. 
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care. 321 Even though the court recognized that the ADA requires 
"case-specific, individualized inquiry," it granted summary judgment 
for the hospital by comparing her limitations to those of other 
plaintiffs, both nurses and others, who had the same lifting 
restriction. 322 The court did not consider any difference in job duties 
between the claimant and these other plaintiffs. It is notable that the 
courts sometimes referenced the commonality of back issues among 
all workers whom the court assumed were "not disabled.,,323 
Like this nurse, claimants with lifting restrictions are often 
compared to other plaintiffs with similar restrictions. For example, 
one grocery store clerk who had been restricted to lift no more than 
"forty pounds occasionally and ten to fifteen pounds frequently" was 
unable to establish a significant limitation on his ability to lift.324 The 
court compared his abilities to plaintiffs in other ADA cases, without 
regard to his particular lifting needs or personal situation, and found 
that he could lift more than others who had not been covered by the 
ADA. 325 The court noted that other appellate courts had been even 
more stringent in their lifting restrictions as a basis for coverage. 326 
Common limitations like back problems may not be enough to 
establish an ADA disability, particularly when shared by earlier 
unsuccessful ADA plaintiffs. For example, an employee who 
suffered a back injury that prevented both standing for long periods 
without a break and standing on one leg was compared to another 
employee who was unable to walk or stand for more than fifty 
minutes, as well as other plaintiffs who lacked an ability to stand for 
long periods, all of whom were not covered by the ADA. 327 In 
321. Squibb v. Mem'l Med. Ctr., 497 F.3d 778,778-79 (7th Cir. 2007). 
322. ld. at 781-82 (citing Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 869-70 (7th Cir. 2002); 
Contreras v. Suncast Corp., 237 F.3d 756,763 (7th Cir. 2001». 
323. Jd. (quoting Mays, 301 FJd at 869). 
324. Rakity v. Dillon Cos., 302 F.3d 1159, 1159-60 (10th Cir. 2002). 
325. ld. at 1160 (citing Lusk v. Ryder Integrated Logistics, 238 F.3d 1237, 1240-41 (10th 
Cir. 2001 ». 
326. Jd. (citing Pryor v. Trane Co., 138 F.3d 1024, 1025 n.2 (5th Cir. 1998) (twenty 
pounds); Thompson v. Holy Family Hosp., 121 F.3d 537, 541 (9th Cir. 1997) (twenty-
five pounds); McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., U.S.A., Inc., 110 F.3d 369,373 (6th Cir. 
1997) (ten pounds); Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 384, 386 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(ten to twenty pounds». 
327. Williams v. Excel Foundry & Mach. Inc., 489 F.3d 309, 311-12 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(citing Dupre v. Charter Behavioral Health Sys. of LaFayette, Inc., 242 F.3d 610, 614 
(5th Cir. 2001); Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 1999); 
Colwell v. Suffolk Cnty. Police Dep't, 158 F.3d 635, 644 (2d Cir. 1998), superseded 
by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (Supp. III 2009); Oesterling v. Walters, 760 F.2d 
859,861 (8th Cir. 1985»; see also Lytes v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 572 F.3d 936, 
944 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Duncan v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 240 F.3d 
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denying these claims, courts may be reacting to the fears expressed 
by the Toyota Court that a broad interpretation of ADA coverage 
could result in a large proportion of the workforce being covered by 
its protections. 328 
Like the sleep cases discussed earlier, a comparison to other 
unsuccessful ADA plaintiffs with an inability to lift often influences 
the outcome. 329 One court even suggested that even if the plaintiff 
presented additional evidence concerning his restrictions, it would 
not have affected the decision to dismiss. 330 That court, like others, 
placed greater importance on other courts' rejection of "claims of 
disability based on an inability to lift similar weights. ,,331 
This ad hoc method of determining whether a limitation on lifting 
is substantial has led to inconsistent results. 332 There are a number of 
simple lifting cases that assert a twenty-five pound restriction is not 
substantially limiting,333 and other courts have found that a ten- or 
fifteen-pound restriction was insufficient as a matter of law, despite 
evidence of restrictions on the claimant's daily activities.334 Yet in 
other cases, a twenty-pound restriction was substantial enough to 
raise a jury question on limited comparative evidence. 335 
These decisions demonstrate the courts' inconsistent requirement 
for comparative evidence. On one hand, the courts insist on 
comparative evidence in some circumstances. On the other hand, 
they have also have used individual, particularized evidence of a 
claimants ability to lift weight to rule that the claimant's disability 
1110, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Marinelli v. City of Erie, 216 F.3d 354, 363-64 (3d Cir. 
2000); Colwell, 158 F.3d at 644)). 
328. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 543 U.S. 184, 197 (2002), superseded by 
statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42,47 U.S.c.). 
329. See supra notes 321-23 and accompanying text. 
330. Marinelli v. City of Erie, Pa., 216 F.3d 354,363-64 (3d Cir. 2000). 
331. See id. 
332. Anderson, supra note 100, at 438-39. 
333. See, e.g., Thompson v. Holy Family Hosp., 121 FJd 537, 540 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(comparing lifting restrictions); Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-Am., Inc., 85 F.3d 
1311, 1319 (8th Cir. 1996) (twenty-five pound limit). 
334. See, e.g., Marinelli, 216 F.3d at 364; Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 868-70 (7th Cir. 
2002) (denying disability recognition to claimant with a lifting restriction of ten 
pounds who was instructed by her physician to not perform work at or above her 
shoulder level, and not lift patients); Zarzycki v. United Tech. Corp., 30 F. Supp. 2d 
283,286, 289 (D. Conn. 1998). 
335. See Whitfield v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 2d 434, 439 (D. Del. 1999) 
(observing that a normal healthy adult is able to lift more than twenty pounds). 
468 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 40 
was "not substantial enough. ,,336 Instead, a court should be 
considering the "effect of a lifting restriction on the employee" or a 
"true expert evaluation of deviation from the average abilities of the 
general population.,,337 
Even in claims based on such an individualized activity as the 
inability to interact with others, courts have compared that employee 
to other plaintiffs who have asserted a limitation on the same life 
activity. For example, one court compared an employee with bipolar 
disorder to another employee with obsessive-compulsive disorder 
who was not covered by the ADA, because they both had problems 
interacting with coworkers. 338 Like employees who have not been 
covered because they can perform at least some life activities, these 
employees were not covered because they did not establish that they 
had problems with interacting with others outside of work. 339 
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit held that an actor was not 
substantially limited in her interactions with others even though the 
court cited a Ninth Circuit case that recognized such a disability. 340 
The court reasoned that the claimant was not substantially limited 
because she was not as reclusive as the covered plaintiff in the Ninth 
Circuit case, despite the claimant's testimony that her impairment 
caused her to avoid interaction with her family, making friends, or 
having a social life, and "cause[ d] her to have episodes," during 
which her employer admitted that she "was unable to behave in a 
normal manner.,,341 Thus, even for such a "personal" disability as the 
inability to interact with others, courts have rejected an individualized 
approach in favor of comparing the current claimant to other 
plaintiffs with somewhat similar limitations.342 
These comparisons to other plaintiffs are sometimes, but rarely, 
used to support a decision to deny a motion for summary judgment 
for the employer. For example, an employee who was required to 
refrain from prolonged walking, frequent bending or stooping with 
the knee, or standing for more than two hours, survived a motion for 
judgment as a matter of law because the court compared him to 
another employee who was also limited in his ability to walk or stand 
336. Anderson, supra note 100, at 440. 
337. See id. 
338. Doebele v. SprintlUnited Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1129-30 (10th Cir. 2003). 
339. Id. at 1131 (citing Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1254-55 (lOth Cir. 2001)). 
340. Rohan v. Network Presentations, LLC, 375 F.3d 266,274-75 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing 
McAlindin v. Cnty. of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
341. Id. at 275. 
342. See id. at 275-76. 
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and had a similar impainnent rating. 343 Similarly, another court 
denied ADA coverage after comparing an employee with an inability 
to sit for more than two hours without a break to another plaintiff 
who had been denied ADA coverage despite an inability to sit for 
more than thirty minutes. 344 Thus, the success of these claimants 
depends largely on the other ADA plaintiffs chosen for comparison. 
4. ADAA's Limited Impact on Comparison to General Population 
Unfortunately, the ADAAA and the EEOC's ADAAA regulations 
may be insufficient to address the common practice among courts of 
requiring evidence of the abilities of others in the general population 
while disregarding the claimant's own account of their limitations, 
and the even more common practice of comparing claimants to other 
plaintiffs with somewhat similar limitations. 345 The EEOC ADAAA 
regulations suggest a shift to comparing the claimant to "most people 
in the general population" rather than the average person. 346 The 
ADAAA regulations do allow for a comparison between actual 
versus eXF,ected achievement for claimants with a learning 
disability.3 7 
However, there is no guarantee that the courts will discontinue their 
requirement of expert testimony, even in cases involving a learning 
disability. In fact, using "expected achievement" as a reference point 
may require expert testimony. Consequently, courts may still require 
evidence supporting a comparison to the abilities of "most people" 
rather than the average person in the general population. 
Courts may also continue to use the somewhat similar limitations 
of fonner plaintiffs who have been excluded from ADA coverage to 
justify the dismissal of new claims, despite personal or even medical 
testimony regarding the extent of the limitation.348 As with the 
reliance on the ability to perfonn other tasks and the consideration of 
the duration or frequency of the impainnent, these comparisons by 
343. Christensen v. Titan Distribution Inc., 481 F.3d 1085, 1092, 1094 (8th Cir. 2007) 
(comparing the employee to the plaintiff in Webner v. Titan Distrib., Inc., 267 F.3d 
828, 834 (8th Cir. 2001 ». 
344. Maclin v. SBC Ameritech, 520 F.3d 781, 787 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Squibb v. Mem'l 
Med. Ctr., 497 F.3d 775,784-85 (7th Cir. 2007». 
345. See Selmi, supra note 13, at 570 ("[T]he [Supreme] Court adopts EEOC 
interpretations when they support its decisions and ignores them when they do not."). 
346. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(ii) (2010). 
347. Id. § 1630.2(i)(I)(v). 
348. See Selmi, supra note 13, at 570 (criticizing the Supreme Court for turning away from 
EEOC regulations defining disability). 
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the courts tend to take the fact-reliant interpretation of substantial 
limitation away from the jury. 
The ADAAA also lacks any specific language regarding what 
evidence is needed for a jury to determine whether a person is 
substantially limited. This omission ignores the conflicting case law 
discussed below regarding a variety of reasoning among appellate 
courts on how to compare the effects of a plaintiffs impairment to 
the abilities of members of the general population, and the 
requirement of medical or other expert testimony to support ADA 
coverage. 349 
The interpretation of "substantially limited" remains murky 
because nothing in the ADAAA indicates how the limitations of a 
person claiming a disability should be compared to the abilities of 
others. The legislative history may provide some guidance, even 
though the EEOC ADAAA regulations do not. The House of 
Representatives Committee on Education and Labor Report states 
that the individual should be compared to most people, not simply to 
someone with the same demographics as the employee, such as 
gender, age, or education.350 This method of comparison was adopted 
in the EEOC ADAAA regulations. 351 Previous EEOC regulations 
directed a comparison of the employee to an "average person in the 
general population," while some courts compared the plaintiff to the 
"average person of similar age, education and experience.,,352 
D. Professional Evidence of Impairment 
The ADA Amendments fail to address the requirement of medical 
and other expert evidence imposed by many appellate courts under 
the ADA. 353 Even though the Supreme Court has not specifically 
required such evidence to avoid summary judgment, some lower 
courts had often required something more than the individual's 
testimony regarding the extent of their limitations. 354 Other courts 
have allowed a claimant to continue to trial based on their own 
testimony, particularly where their limitations were obvious and 
349. See Moysis v. DTG Datanet, 278 F.3d 819, 824-25 (8th Cir. 2002); see also Pollard v. 
High's ofBaitimore, Inc., 281 F.3d 462, 469 (4th Cir. 2002). 
350. H.R. REp. No. 110-730, at 9-10 (2008). 
35l. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(a)(ii) (2011). 
352. Weisberg v. Riverside Twp. Bd. ofEduc., 180 F. App'x 357, 362 n.2 (3d Cir. 2006). 
353. See generally ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42,47 U.S.C.). 
354. See Douglas v. Victor Capital Grp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 379, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
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could be easily understood by a jury. 355 These varying approaches 
are discussed below. 
Many ADA claims have been dismissed based on a lack of reliable 
professional testimony.356 Yet the original ADA did not address the 
role of expert testimony from medical professionals or vocational 
experts in establishing the scope of the ADA's coverage. 357 The 
legislative history for the original ADA is also silent on this issue. 358 
Even the EEOC's original regulations failed to indicate whether 
medical evidence was required to establish the substantial nature of 
the disability. 359 
Despite a lack of language specific to the question of professional 
testimony, the legislative history of the ADA suggests that a 
comparison to an "'average' person is not based on a scientifically 
precise calculation," which likely would come from an expert 
witness.36o Instead, that history suggests that the determination of 
coverage should be based "on commonly understood human 
capabilities.,,361 The House Report provides one example: "A person 
who can walk for 10 miles continuously is not substantially limited in 
walking merely because on the eleventh mile, he or she begins to 
experience pain because most people would not be able to walk 
eleven miles without experiencing some discomfort.,,362 This history 
supports the position that ADA coverage can be "based on a common 
sense understanding" of the effects of the impairment, rather than 
suggesting that "Congress had an exacting standard in mind."363 
In contrast to this history, the EEOC provides only limited support 
for requiring expert testimony to establish a substantial limitation. 
With respect to the limitation on the ability to work, the EEOC 
guidance stated, 
The terms 'number and types of jobs,' ... are not intended 
to require an onerous evidentiary showing. Rather, the 
terms only require the presentation of evidence of general 
355. See Cambria v. Ass'n of Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO, No. 03-CV-5605, 2005 WL 
1563343, at *10 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 2005). 
356. See, e.g., Duncan v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 240 F.3d 1110, 1\ 16-17 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001). 
357. Smith, supra note 96, at 13. 
358. Id. at 14. 
359. Anderson, supra note 100, at 416. 
360. Id. 
361. Id. 
362. H.R. REp. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 V.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334. 
363. Anderson, supra note 100, at 417-18. 
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employment demographics and/or of recognized 
occupational classifications that indicate the approximate 
number of jobs (e.g. 'few,' 'many,' 'most') from which an 
individual would be excluded because of an impairment. 364 
This section suggests that even vocational expert testimony should 
not be required. 365 
The lack of additional guidance from either the ADA or the EEOC 
regulations has led to a variety of approaches among courts that are 
either presented with expert testimony or who seek but do not receive 
it. Unfortunately, neither the ADAAA nor the EEOC ADAAA 
regulations interpreting the amendments provide much additional 
guidance on this influential issue. 
Even though the EEOC did not address the use of medical evidence 
directly in its original regulations, some experts believe that the 
regulations' emphasis on individualized assessment gave courts the 
basis for requiring expert testimony to establish the coverage of the 
ADA. 366 The ADA regulations only state "that specific information 
is required regarding the impact of the impairment on the plaintiff, 
along with comparative evidence regarding how that impact 
compares with limitations experienced by the average person in the 
general population.,,367 
The 1997 EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Americans with 
Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities provides stronger 
indication of the agency's preference for expert testimony: 
Relevant evidence for EEOC investigators includes 
descriptions of an individual's typical level of functioning at 
home, at work, and in other settings, as well as evidence 
showing that the individual's functional limitations are 
linked to his/her impairment. Expert testimony about 
substantial limitation is not necessarily required. Credible 
testimony from the individual with a disability and his/her 
family members, friends, or coworkers may suffice. 368 
364. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j) (2010). 
365. See id. 
366. Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: 
What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 91, 135 (2000); Smith, supra note 96, at 15. 
367. Smith, supra note 96, at 15. 
368. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND 
PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, supra note 182, § 4. 
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In contrast, in the part discussing the Title I (employment) 
definition of the term "disability" contained in the Commission's 
ADA Compliance Manual, a publication directed at EEOC 
investigators, the EEOC suggests that medical documentation may be 
necessary as part of an investigation if the claimed disability is not 
"obvious" to the investigator. 369 In those situations, the investigator 
should take steps to obtain medical documentation.370 A footnote 
also states that medical documentation may be necessary to 
determine if the impairment results in a substantial limitation of one 
or more major life activities. 371 
The Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the issue of 
whether medical or other professional evidence should be required to 
establish ADA coverage. After the passage of the ADA, the 
Albertson's Court stated generally that the burden to establish a 
substantial limitation should not be "onerous.,,372 Professor Anderson 
has interpreted this decision as allowing "ADA plaintiffs to prove a 
disability by offering evidence that the extent of the limitation in 
terms of their own experience ... is substantial." 373 One can 
interpret this decision as establishing that "insisting on additional 
'scientific' evidence of average is unnecessary in many ... cases.,,374 
Since both the ADA regulations and the Supreme Court require an 
individualized case-by-case review of the impact of an alleged 
impairment on the individual, courts should focus on the claimant's 
individual experience of her disability, particularly as it impacts her 
major life activities. The claimant has the most direct information 
about these facts.375 Therefore, the courts' "focus [should] be on 
'barriers in that person's environment,' rather than requiring" 
evidence of the "medical details about the impairment.,,376 Some 
courts follow this reasoning and allow a claimant to establish his or 
her ADA coverage using "the common sense and life experience of 
the fact finder, ... based only on enough evidence to alert the jury to 
the individualized nature of her limitations.,,377 
369. SECTION 902: DEFINITION OF THE TERM "DISABILITY", supra note 183, § 902.2(b )(2). 
370. Jd. 
371. !d. at n.6. 
372. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 56~67 (1999). 
373. Jd.; see also Anderson, supra note 100, at 475. 
374. Anderson, supra note 100, at 475. 
375. Smith, supra note 96, at 70. 
376. Jd. at 74 (quoting Claudia Center & Andrew J. Imparato, Redefining "Disability" 
Discrimination: A Proposal to Restore Civil Rights Protections for All Workers, 14 
STAN. L. & POL'y REv. 321,324 (2003)). 
377. Anderson, supra note 100, at 424-25. 
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More often, though, courts criticize and even exclude a claimant's 
evidence about the impact of his or her own impairment because the 
claimant's testimony is "self-serving" and therefore insufficient to 
prevent summary judgment for the employer. 378 Yet generally 
accepted rules of evidence would allow an employee to testify 
regarding medical information that is within his or her knowledge, 
including one's "general condition" and symptoms, as well as the 
impact of that condition on daily life. 379 Under these general rules, an 
employee's opinion about her own condition is admissible so long as 
her opinion is "rationally based" upon her own perception of the 
condition, rather than upon "scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge. ,,380 
Despite the fact that claimants often have the most information 
about the extent of their impairments, some courts have excluded 
their testimony on this issue. For example, one trial court held that 
the claimant was incompetent to testify about the impact of his HIV 
infection on his ability to reproduce, and his claim was dismissed 
without medical evidence on the issue. 381 Similarly, another claimant 
was not allowed by a trial court to testify that she had been diagnosed 
with certain impairments, although she could generally "describe[] 
her physical condition.,,382 
Even when the claimant is allowed to present information about the 
impact of his or her impairment, a good number of ADA claims have 
been dismissed based on a failure to present medical or other 
professional evidence to establish the extent of the claimant's 
limitation.383 Several judges have specifically stated that a claimant's 
"failure to include expert medical evidence" was the primary basis 
for granting summary judgment for the employer. 384 These courts 
give medical evidence a "central and indispensable role" in deciding 
motions for summary judgment based on a lack of ADA coverage. 385 
Those who view the ADA as an extension of other civil rights 
protections have criticized this "medical model" approach. 386 
Professor Smith contrasts the medical evidence requirement for ADA 
plaintiffs with religious discrimination claims, which are rarely, if 
378. Smith, supra note 96, at 30-31. 
379. ld. at 66. 
380. FED. R. EVID. 701. 
381. See Cruz Carrillo v. AMR Eagle, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 142,145 (D.P.R. 2001). 
382. See Holt v. Olmsted Twp. Bd. ofTrs., 43 F. Supp. 2d 812,819-20 (N.D. Ohio 1998). 
383. See Smith, supra note 96, at 21-24. 
384. Id. at 20. 
385. Id. 
386. See id. at 8,37. 
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ever, dismissed on a motion for summary jUdgment for failing to 
present expert testimony regarding the sincerity of their religious 
beliefs, even if there is some question as to their credibility. 387 
Reliance on expert testimony focuses on the physical effects of an 
impairment on the claimant rather than its effects on the claimant in 
their work and home environment. 388 Critics of the medical model 
have stated that the medical evidence requirement is based on the 
perspective that the employee's limitations arise only because of "a 
defective, or abnormal, or pathological feature," rather than the 
limitations presented by the workplace. 389 
A requirement of providing expert testimony in defense of a motion 
for summary judgment furthers the focus on the pathology of the 
person's impairment, which is characteristic of the medical model 
discussed above, rather than considering the "externally-imposed 
barriers that limit a person's access to all segments of society.,,39o 
This focus undermines the role of the ADA as a civil rights statute 
meant to decrease discrimination, rather than a tool to exclude people 
from protection based on their abilities. 391 
In dismissing claims, courts often distinguish between a health care 
provider's finding of an "impairment" and a conclusion that the 
impairment is substantially limiting. For example, one court held that 
the report of a claimant's doctor was conclusory and was insufficient 
to defeat summary judgment for the employer because the person's 
"inability to localize sound did not substantially limit her overall 
ability to hear."392 Combined with an unwillingness to rely on the 
claimant's testimony as to the extent of his or her limitations, this 
approach places a significant burden on claimants to obtain in-depth 
information about the effects of the impairment from their health care 
provider. 393 
Experts also have criticized the reliance on medical evidence to 
interpret substantial limitation because health care providers might 
not be proficient in providing the information that is most relevant to 
that determination. 394 Even though health care providers can 
387. Id. at 38. 
388. See id. at 52-53. 
389. See id. at 12-13. 
390. ld. at 5. 
391. ld. at 3. 
392. Walton v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 492 F.3d 998, 1008 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Broussard 
v. Univ. of Cal., at Berkeley, 192 F.3d 1252,1258-59 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
393. See Smith, supra note 96, at 40-41. 
394. See Anderson, supra note 100, at 467. 
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"measure average capacity versus diminished capacity," they may not 
be sufficiently "able to measure how [an] impainnent" does or does 
not satisfy the statute's definition of disability.395 This inability 
comes from a healthcare provider's focus on symptoms and treatment 
rather than a "comparison of that individual to some" average ability 
amongst the general population. 396 
Relying on medical evidence to interpret the scope of a substantial 
limitation poses difficulties of proof for claimants. 397 Since courts 
detennine what is "average" based on medical science, "comparative 
evidence must have sufficient scientific validity to be admissible ... 
[and] must also assist the trier of fact in understanding a fact in 
issue.,,398 This type of infonnation may not be available "if there is 
no science of 'average' in regard to the impainnent at issue.,,399 For 
example, one court rejected the testimony of a physician who used a 
percentile fonnula to compare a plaintiff's ten-pound lifting 
restriction to the overall population, where the court found that the 
physician's report provided no basis for the percentile comparison. 400 
If neither the ADA nor the regulations clearly require medical 
evidence to establish a substantial limitation, what is the basis of this 
requirement? The expectation of medical evidence could arise from 
courts' skepticism about the genuine extent of a claimant's 
limitations.401 The concern about "malingering is [demonstrated] by 
courts' persistence in assigning physicians the role of screening out 
specious claims of disability.,,402 Consequently, a claim is often 
dismissed if a claimant's description of her impainnent varies from 
the health care provider's description, even though this can be seen as 
a disputed issue of fact to be resolved by a jury. 403 
This deference to the healthcare provider's view may be 
inappropriate, especially on summary judgment, because the provider 
may not be fully aware of the obstacles faced by the claimant, 
because these factors may not be relevant to their diagnosis and 
treatment. 404 Several studies also point out that physicians may be 
395. Id. at 467, 470. 
396. Id. at 467. 
397. See id. at 415,473. 
398. Id. at 471. 
399. Jd. 
400. Gallegos v. Swift & Co., 237 F.R.D. 633,640 (D. Colo. 2006). 
401. Smith, supra note 96, at 40. 
402. Id. at 40-41. 
403. Id. at 41. 
404. Id. at 57. 
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unable to accurately judge patients' subjective complaints, especially 
pain. 405 
In ADA cases, courts have tended to look to expert witnesses to 
make credibility determinations and take away the fact-finding role 
of the jury by interpreting evidence about issues that should be 
decided by the finder of fact, including whether or not the plaintiff is 
reliable.406 At the same time, doctors do not claim "to be able to 
ascertain disability or malingering or to accurately assess limitations 
on major life activities to any degree of accuracy.,,407 In addition, 
medical research establishes that physicians cannot reliably detect 
malingering. 408 
Dismissing claims on summary judgment based on a lack of 
medical evidence is undermining the role of juries in ADA claims.409 
By excluding or discounting the testimony of claimants regarding the 
extent of their limitations, juries are not being allowed to determine 
the validity of those limitations.41o Instead, expectations of medical 
evidence to defend against summary judgment motions places 
requirements on ADA claimants that are beyond the statutory 
requirements and that "misapply the core principles of summary 
judgment analysis.,,411 
405. See John T. Chibnall et aI., Internist Judgments o/Chronic Low Back Pain, 1 PAIN 
MED. 231,235-36 (2000); John T. Chibnall et aI., The Effects of Medical Evidence 
and Pain Intensity on Medical Student Judgments of Chronic Pain Patients, 20 1. 
BEHAV. MED. 257, 266-68 (1997); Laetitia Marquie et aI., Pain Rating by Patients 
and Physicians: Evidence of Systematic Pain Miscalibration, 102 PAIN 289, 289-94 
(2003); Maida 1. Sewitch et aI., Measuring Differences Between Patients' and 
Physicians' Health Perceptions: The Patient-Physician Discordance Scale, 26 1. 
BEHAV. MED. 245,254 (2003). 
406. George Mendelson & Danuta Mendelson, Malingering Pain in the Medicolegal 
Context, 20 CLINICAL J. PAIN 423,429 (2004). 
407. Smith, supra note 96, at 4. 
408. See Mark Thimineur et aI., Malingering and Symptom Magnification: A Case Report 
Illustrating the Limitations of Clinical Judgment, 64 CONN. MED. 399, 400 (2000) 
("There are ... no reliable methods to identify the malingering chronic pain patient."); 
Kenneth D. Craig & Melanie A. Badali, Introduction to the Special Series on Pain 
Deception and Malingering, 20 CLINICAL J. PAIN 377, 378-80 (2004); David A. 
Fishbain et aI., Is There a Relationship Between Nonorganic Physical Findings 
(Waddell Signs) and Secondary Gain/Malingering?, 20 CLINICAL J. PAIN 399, 400, 
408 (2004); Mark Sullivan, Exaggerated Pain Behavior: By What Standard?, 20 
CLINICAL J. PAIN 433, 433-34 (2004). 
409. Smith, supra note 96, at 36. 
410. Id. at 30, 36. 
411. Id. 
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In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, a court should not 
weigh the evidence to determine if the claimant is substantially 
limited in a major life activity, but should only determine if there is a 
genuine issue of material fact for trial. 412 Juries should make the 
factual determination as to whether a claimant is truly disabled or is 
overstating her limitations to gain ADA's protections because the 
probative value of both expert and non-expert testimony should be 
evaluated by the jury.413 
Despite the lack of requirements for expert evidence in the ADA, 
courts often have required expert evidence that clearly outlines "what 
is 'average' and how the [claimant] deviates from that standard.,,414 
Comparative evidence is required even more often "where the 
disability is not plain 'on its face.",415 Thus, some courts are willing 
to allow fact finders to determine ADA coverage without expert 
testimony if the effects of the impairment are obvious, such as "a 
person confined to a wheelchair [being] substantially limited in the 
major life activity of walking.,,416 Although courts do sometimes 
recognize that some impairments are obviously limiting, many courts 
will still fail to credit evidence from non-experts, including the 
claimants themselves, that would be sufficient for the fact finder to 
judge whether the impairment presents a substantiallimitation.417 
Some courts place so much value on medical or other expert 
evidenc~ that a verdict will be given greater deference if the jury 
agrees with that evidence. For example, a jury verdict in favor of an 
employee with depression, anxiety, and obsessive-compulsive 
disorder was upheld on appeal based on medical evidence 
establishing the extent of the employee's impairment. 418 The 
employer challenged the verdict based on the physician's credibility, 
but the court concluded that the credibility of the physician's 
"testimony was a question of fact [that should be] resolved by the jury.,,419 
Medical evidence can also help a claimant survive a motion for 
summary judgment. For example, a utility company employee who 
was unable to sit for more than three hours per day survived a motion 
412. Id. at 35 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). 
413. Id. at 4. 
414. Anderson, supra note 100, at 424. 
415. Id. at 430 (quoting Lusk v. Ryder Integrated Logistics, 238 F.3d 1237, 1241 (lOth Cir. 
2001)). 
416. Witty. Nw. Aluminum Co., 177 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1131 (D. Or. 2001). 
417. See id. at 430-31. 
418. Battle v. United Parcel Servo Inc., 438 F.3d 856, 862 (8th Cir. 2006). 
419. Id. (citing Kammueller V. Loomis, Fargo & Co., 383 F.3d 779, 788 (8th Cir. 2004)). 
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for summary judgment because in granting the motion, the lower 
court had mischaracterized the medical evidence submitted, 
particularly where that testimony was consistent with the employee's 
own testimony "that sitting during the training was difficult and that 
others noticed his discomfort." 420 The court concluded that the 
employee's "ability to sit [was] significantly more restricted than the 
average person.,,421 
Without medical evidence in his or her favor, a claimant may be 
able to rely on his or her own testimony if the impairment and the 
limitations caused by it are obvious. For some courts, a claimant's 
testimony "may be sufficient to support a finding against the 
defendant assuming that the witness can present admissible testimony 
on each element of the claim.,,422 For example, the lack of a thumb 
and a finger on the right hand of an employee was sufficient to defeat 
a motion for summary judgment under the Toyota standard for 
establishing a significant limitation in caring for oneself. 423 The court 
relied on the claimant's testimony that it took him twice as long to 
perform tasks like shaving or preparing a meal, but he also submitted 
a supportive letter from his doctor that confirmed these difficulties. 424 
It is important to note that the employer did not produce 
contradictory medical evidence, but only attacked this employee's 
credibility. 425 
In contrast to "less obvious" impairments, like lifting restrictions or 
limitations on working, some conditions have been seen as 
"sufficiently 'obvious' and therefore [did] not requir[e] expert 
testimony," at least to survive a summary judgment motion.426 Those 
conditions have "include [ d] arm and neck pain,427 back and 
abdominal pain,428 and hearing 10ss429.,,430 Thus, claimants with 
420. Jenkins v. Cleco Power LLC, 487 F.3d 309, 315 (5th Cir. 2007). 
421. Id (citing 29 C.F.R. § I 630.2G)(I)(ii) (2010». 
422. Smith, supra note 96, at 32-33. 
423. Fenney v. Dakota Minn. & E. R.R., 327 F.3d 707, 713-16 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing 
Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 543 U.S. 184, 197 (2002), superseded by 
statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42,47 U.S.C.». 
424. Id at 715-16. 
425. Id at 716. 
426. Smith, supra note 96, at 60. 
427. Marinelli v. City of Erie, Pa., 216 F.3d 354,361 (3d Cir. 2000). 
428. Dicino v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, No. 01-3206(JBS), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26487, at 
*1, *21 (D.N.J. June 23,2003). 
429. Gourley v. Home Depot, No. 99-5728,2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9089, at *3 & n.6 (E.D. 
Pa. June 29, 2001). 
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physically obvious impainnents may be more likely to survIve a 
motion for summary judgment. 
Even some lifting-restricted claimants have not required medical 
evidence where the limitations were based on an obvious physical 
condition. For example, an applicant for an EMT position who could 
not perfonn the two-hand lift because of her lack of a hand and lower 
ann on one side was able to establish ADA coverage. 431 Even 
without any medical testimony, the court recognized that "a· one-
handed individual must develop an array of techniques to overcome 
her innate limitation.,,432 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit accepted, with 
little question, a fifteen-pound weight restriction while noting that the 
restriction was the result of the plaintiffs multiple sclerosis. 433 The 
trial court relied merely on the fact that she had multiple sclerosis, a 
long-tenn, incurable disease, and as a result, was unable to lift more 
than fifteen pounds. 434 
At the other extreme from these claims involving "obvious" 
limitations, other courts will grant summary judgment for an 
employer in the absence of medical evidence. If a court requires 
medical evidence to support ADA coverage, that court may also 
require "that any medical evidence be limited to a physician's 
'independent' assessment of the nature of the impainnent and the 
extent of any limitations.,,435 Under such a requirement, medical 
testimony is rejected as a basis for ADA coverage if it is based on 
statements of the claimant, even if those statements were a part of the 
person's treatment, because the medical evidence is treated as lacking 
objectivity. 436 
Decisions in ADA cases provide numerous examples of the 
importance attached to medical and other expert testimony. 437 
Claimants who lack any professional description of their limitations 
often fail at the summary judgment stage.438 The First Circuit 
established early in the life of the ADA that medical evidence was 
required to demonstrate that the claimant was substantially limited in 
430. Smith, supra note 96, at 60. 
431. Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Servo Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 2002). 
432. Id. at 23. 
433. Lowe V. Angelo's Italian Foods, Inc., 87 F.3d 1170, 1174 (10th Cir. 1996). 
434. ld. 
435. Smith, supra note 96, at 54. 
436. ld. at 54-55. 
437. See, e.g., Fredricksen v. United Parcel Servo Co., 581 F.3d 516 (7th Cir. 2009); 
McPhaul V. Madison Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 226 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2000); Katz v. 
City Metal Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1996). 
438. See Smith, supra note 96, at 54-55. 
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a major life activity, although medical evidence was not required to 
establish the existence of the impairment itself. 439 In a claim of an 
employee with a heart condition that affected his breathing and 
walking, the court explained that "there is . . . no general rule that 
medical testimony is always necessary to establish disability," 
including "long-term impairments [that] would be obvious to a lay 
jury.,,440 The court allowed that some claimants could provide "a 
description of treatments and symptoms over a substantial period" 
providing a basis for ADA coverage. 441 This decision was one of the 
first to directly require the presentation of medical evidence to 
establish ADA coverage, depending on the nature and the 
"obviousness" or long term impact of the impairment, and "whether 
the limitations from [the] impairment would be understood by a lay 
jury without the assistance of expert testimony.,,442 
The effects of this emphasis on the need for medical evidence are 
seen in the more recent Seventh Circuit claim of a woman diagnosed 
with fibromyalgia, for which she sought a reasonable 
accommodation. 443 Her claim was dismissed on summary judgment 
despite her evidence that her "symptoms included fatigue, insomnia, 
shortness of breath and muscle pain, including sore hands and joints" 
and "that her condition made it difficult for her to concentrate, bathe, 
walk, write and work.,,444 The court noted the absence of medical 
evidence, and stated that her "self-serving testimony" could not 
support a finding that she was "a qualified individual with a 
disability. ,,445 
In 2009, the Seventh Circuit also dismissed the ADA claim of an 
employee with leukemia who was unable to establish a substantial 
limitation on his ability to walk despite his own testimony that he was 
unable "to walk for 'the same period of time or in the same way' as a 
'normal individual' because of muscle and joint fatigue.,,446 Without 
any medical testimony to support his position, the court compared his 
walking abilities to other employees who had been included or 
439. See Katz, 87 F.3d at 3l. 
440. Id. at 32. 
441. Id. 
442. Smith, supra note 96, at 25-26. 
443. McPhaul v. Madison Cnty. Bd. ofComm'rs, 226 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2000). 
444. Jd. at 562. 
445. Id. at 564. 
446. Fredricksen v. United Parcel Servo Co., 581 F.3d 516, 521 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting the 
plaintiff). 
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excluded under the ADA by other courts. 447 Despite his own 
testimony that he "occasionally [became] winded when walking up 
stairs [ and grew] tired while grocery shopping," the court concluded 
that he failed to "demonstrate that his ability to walk diverged 
significantly from that of the general population.,,448 These cases 
demonstrate that where the limitation is less than obvious, at least 
some courts will not provide ADA coverage based only on the 
claimant's description of his or her own limitations. 
1. Expert Testimony for Less Obvious Impairments 
Some courts take a somewhat more lenient approach, requmng 
medical testimony only to support the coverage of employees with 
less obvious impairments. 449 Under this approach, conditions still 
requiring expert testimony have included a heart condition,450 deep 
vein thrombosis,451 fibromyalgia,452 a learning disorder453 or cognitive 
impairment,454 sleep disorders,455 as well as anxiety disorders and 
agoraphobia. 456 For example, the Eighth Circuit granted summary 
judgment against an employee who could not perform tasks with his 
right arm, in part because he did not provide medical testimony.457 
Comparative evidence will often be required "[ w ] here the disability 
is less [than] obvious" because without it, claimants cannot establish 
that their abilities are less than "some 'average' norm. ,,458 In 
particular, in claims based on an inability to lift, courts have often 
required such comparative evidence and where there is none, "often 
447. Id. at 522. 
448. Id. at 522-23. 
449. Smith, supra note 96, at 58. 
450. See Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26,32 (1st Cir. 1996). 
451. Lakota v. Sonoeo Prods. Co., No. 00-30219-FHF, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6422, at 
*10-11 (D. Mass. Apr. 4, 2002). 
452. Brandon v. Klingensmith Healthcare, Inc., No. 03-1963, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
32577, at *12-15 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 13,2005). 
453. Dom v. Potter, 191 F. Supp. 2d 612, 623 (W.D. Pa. 2002). 
454. Kurten v. Hanger Prosthetic & Orthotics, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 2d 572, 581 n.7 (W.D. Pa. 
2005). 
455. Peter v. Lincoln Technical Inst., 255 F. Supp. 2d 417, 429 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
456. Ashton v. AT&T Corp., No. 03-CV-3158 (DMC), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21419, at 
*9-10 (D.N.J. Sept. 21, 2005), affd, 225 F. App'x 61 (3d Cir. 2007). 
457. Didier v. Schwan Food Co., 465 F.3d 838, 841-42 (8th Cir. 2006) (distinguishing 
Fenney v. Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R., 327 F.3d 707,716 (8th Cir. 2003) and citing Bass 
v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc., 418 F.3d 870, 873-74 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting that plaintiffs 
opinions that he could have returned to work were insufficient evidence to survive 
summary judgment)). 
458. Anderson, supra note 100, at 431. 
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find lifting restrictions not substantially limiting as a matter of 
law.,,459 
For example, the Sixth Circuit refused to find that a person with a 
lifting restriction was disabled, even with medical evidence that the 
claimant could lift no more than five to ten pounds in the work 
setting. 460 Because the doctor's report only discussed the limitation 
with respect to work-related activities, the claimant failed to present 
any evidence showing that her inability to lift more than ten pounds 
substantially affected her daily life outside of work. 461 It seems 
contradictory that, in its decision, the court had earlier 
"acknowledged that specific comparative evidence [generally] was 
not required and that common sense and life experience are a 
sufficient basis for the fact finder to draw a conclusion" but that this 
common sense approach did not extend to lifting restrictions.462 
Concerns about the review of lifting restrictions have included a 
lack of a consistent doctrine as to when the claimant can rely on his 
or her own testimony regarding the limitations and when expert 
comparative evidence is required. 463 Overall, some courts "dismiss 
the claim simply because the claimant failed to present evidence of 
average ability.,,464 In contrast, more lenient courts are willing to 
assume the importance of the activities the claimant is limited to, 
even without "comparative evidence... to [support] that 
assumption.,,465 In most circumstances, however, expert comparative 
evidence will be needed to prevent a court from assuming that a 
person's ability to lift is not important, even though what is average 
for lifting could be seen as "a matter of common sense and life 
experience" that a jury could apply. 466 
Like the ability-to-lift analysis, the treatment of other less obvious 
limitations has placed significant emphasis on expert medical 
testimony to support ADA coverage. 467 The D.C. Circuit Court failed 
459. Jd. at 434. 
460. Jd. at 449 (citing Gerton v. Verizon S., Inc., 145 F. App'x 159, 165-66 (6th Cir. 
2005». 
461. Id. (citing Gerton, 145 F. App'x at 166). 
462. Jd. (citing Gerton, 145 F. App'x at 165-66). 
463. See Anderson, supra note 100, at 412. 
464. Id. at 426. 
465. Jd. 
466. Id. at 426-27. 
467. See, e.g., Stein v. Ashcroft, 284 F.3d 721, 726 (7th Cir. 2002) (affirming the district 
court's grant of summary judgment, in part because plaintiff failed to present medical 
records, evaluations, or opinions to support plaintiffs allegations); Contreras v. 
Suncast Corp., 237 F.3d 756, 764 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming summary judgment 
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to recognize an employee's disability based on a severe skin irritation 
from the work environment, in the absence of specific medical 
evidence "'regarding the extent to which [his skin irritation] impacted 
his ability to sleep. ",468 The claim was dismissed on summary 
judgment based on the employee's failure to submit expert medical 
testimony, even while referencing the Supreme Court's guidance that 
a jury, not the judge, should make credibility determinations, weigh 
the evidence, and draw inferences from the facts. 469 
Even for less than obvious limitations, a limited amount of medical 
evidence may be sufficient in some courts to establish a substantial 
limitation. For example, an employee with MS was able to survive a 
motion for summary judgment in the Third Circuit based in part on 
testimony from her doctor that her abilities to concentrate and 
remember were the result of her MS and that there was no cure for 
MS.470 It is interesting that neither this medical expert nor the 
personal testimony establishing her fatigue compared her ability to 
concentrate and remember to her abilities prior to the illness or to 
others in the general population.471 
Like this MS claimant, an employee with asthma was able to 
survive a motion for summary judgment in the Tenth Circuit based 
on a combination of her testimony and information from her health-
care providers. 472 Together, this evidence established that her asthma 
prevented her from engaging in a variety of activities (such as 
exposure to cold air and cleaning agents), that the effects could not be 
completely controlled by medication, and that she "is symptomatic 
most of the time. ,,473 The court also compared her ability to breathe 
to the general population and found that her "reactions to common 
substances, the limitations on her activities, her multiple 
hospitalizations, and her frequent trips to the emergency room all" 
supported her allegations that she was substantially limited in her 
ability to breathe. 474 
because plaintiff failed to substantiate his claim of sexual difficulties with any 
documentation or testimony beyond a general assertion). 
468. Haynes v. Williams, 392 F.3d 478, 482 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting the district court 
below, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2003)). 
469. ld. at 482 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Looby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986». 
470. Gagliardo v. Connaught Labs., Inc., 311 F.3d 565, 569-70 (3d Cir. 2002). 
471. See id. (lacking any discussion or comparison of plaintiff to the average person in the 
general population). 
472. Albert v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 356 F.3d 1242, 1251 (10th Cir. 2004). 
473. ld. at 1250-51. 
474. ld. at 1251; see also TaJley v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., 542 F.3d 1099, 
1103, 1l0(M)7 (6th Cir. 2008) (showing that an employee with degenerative 
osteoarthritis of her cervical and lumbar spine, who was unable to stand for long 
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In contrast to some of the claims discussed above, some appellate 
courts will allow a claim to proceed to trial based on the evidence 
from the claimant alone, even if the limitations are not overtly 
obvious.475 These courts are more willing to allow a jury to make the 
final determination on the ADA's coverage, as long as the claimant 
sufficiently explains the extent of his or her limitations.476 For 
example, a truck driver with a heart condition was able to survive a 
motion for summary judgment challenging his ADA coverage in the 
Ninth Circuit, based on his testimony that his impairment caused him 
to become "light-headed, ha[ve] difficulty concentrating and 
breathing, ha[ ve] chest pain when undertaking activities in extreme 
heat for extended periods of time, and ha[ ve] similar symptoms when 
lifting weight over 50 pounds.,,477 
The trial court had based its dismissal of the truck driver's claim on 
the lack of a comparison to the average person in the general 
population, but the appellate court held that the employee's testimony 
alone was enough to create genuine issues of material fact regarding 
his ADA coverage.478 Even so, the court referenced the deposition 
testimony of the employee's cardiologist regarding his limitations, in 
combination with the employee's own description of his limitations 
in breathing, in denying summary judgment. 479 
Another Ninth Circuit decision relied upon in the truck driver's 
case provides a more thorough explanation of that court's 
periods, survived a motion for summary judgment based on her testimony regarding 
the extent of her inability to stand, testimony of coworkers regarding her pain while 
standing at work, and doctors' letters and evaluations). 
475. See, e.g., Gribben v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 528 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2008) 
("[Plaintiff's] testimony alone regarding the significance of his impairment is 
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact at the summary judgment stage."); 
Head v. Glacier Nw., Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that a 
plaintiff's testimony may be sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact at 
the summary judgment stage). 
476. See, e.g., Head, 413 F.3d at 1059 ("[A)n affidavit supporting the existence of a 
disability must not be merely self-serving and must contain sufficient detail to convey 
the existence of an impairment."); Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1042 (9th Cir. 
2003) (stating that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate the extent of 
her limitation). 
477. Gribben, 528 F.3d at 1168, 1171. 
478. Id. at 1170 (citing Head, 413 F .3d at 1058). 
479. It is notable that summary judgment was not granted even though no comparison was 
made to the breathing capacities of the average person in the general population or 
other ADA plaintiffs. !d. at 1171; see also Fraser, 342 F .3d at 1042 (finding that 
diabetic employee survives motion for summary judgment based on her testimony and 
information from her doctor regarding the risks of her condition). 
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reasoning. 480 The trial court had granted partial summary judgment 
for the employer because the claimant failed to present medical 
evidence in support of his claim that he was disabled due to 
depression and bipolar disorder. 481 The claimant had submitted a 
detailed affidavit describing the impact of these conditions on his 
ability to sleep, interact with others, read, and think.482 The appellate 
court explained its reversal: 
Ninth Circuit precedent does not require comparative or 
medical evidence to establish a genuine issue of material 
fact regarding the impairment of a major life activity at the 
summary judgment stage. Rather, our precedent supports 
the principle that a plaintiffs testimony may suffice to 
establish a genuine issue of material fact. 483 
The appeals court did still note that any supporting affidavits "must 
not be merely self-serving and must contain sufficient detail to 
convey the existence of an impairment.,,484 Even so, the court's 
denial of summary judgment was based on the employee's own 
declaration outlining the extent of his limitations in his interactions 
with others. 485 
These cases demonstrate the wide variety of evidentiary 
requirements applied to claims of ADA coverage where the limitation 
is less than obvious. Some courts require expert testimony to support 
coverage, while others will at least refuse a motion for summary 
judgment if the claimant can establish the extent of the limitation 
through his or her own testimony. 
2. Expert Testimony on Ability to Work 
Like the courts that require medical evidence to support claims 
based on other less obvious limitations on other major life activities, 
courts typically have looked for specific expert evidence regarding 
the extent of a claimant's limitations on working. 486 Inability to work 
480. Head, 413 F.3d at 1058. 
481. Jd. at 1057. 
482. Jd. at 1060-62. 
483. Jd. at 1058. 
484. Jd. at 1059; see also McAlindin v. Cnty. of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226,1235-36 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (noting that the employee's "alleged 'fear reaction' and 'communicative 
paralysis' are sufficiently severe to raise a genuine issue of material fact about his 
ability to interact with others"), amended on denial ofreh 'g, 201 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 
2000). 
485. Head, 431 F.3d at 1060-6l. 
486. See Smith, supra note 96, at 19-30. 
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just one job typically is not enough to establish ADA coverage. 487 
Although not required under the ADA, courts often have adopted the 
EEOC's regulatory requirement that a person be prevented from 
performing a broad class of jobs or a wide range of jobs to be 
substantially limited in their ability to work. 488 
In this direction, to establish an inability to perform more than just 
one job, the EEOC regulations do not require expert testimony to 
show an inability to perform a broad class or wide range of jobs. 489 
Yet courts often require such evidence, even in response to a motion 
for summary judgment. For example, an alcoholic was not disabled 
as a matter of law despite limitations on his ability to work, where he 
failed to produce "evidence concerning the accessible geographic 
area, the numbers and types of jobs in the area foreclosed due to the 
impairment, and the types of training, skills, and abilities required by 
the jobs.,,490 
Either in response to a motion for summary judgment or to support 
a jury verdict, a claimant typically must offer specific evidence about 
relevant labor markets to show a substantial limitation of their ability 
to work. 491 This requirement is illustrated by the District of 
Columbia's Circuit Court's decision in a claim by an employee 
suffering from degenerative disc disease that limited his ability to lift 
and to work. 492 The original appellate opinion included a strong 
dissent by Justice Edwards that the majority required too much 
evidence from the claimant on a motion for summary judgment. 493 
This position was later adopted by the court. 494 
487. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2010); see Colwell v. Suffolk Cnty. Police Dep't, 158 
F.3d 635, 643-44 (2d Cir. 1998) (explaining that an inability to perfonn a narrow 
range of jobs was not enough), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 112 Stat. 3353, as recognized in Ragusa v. Malverne 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 381 F. App'x 85, 88 n.2 (2d Cir. 2010); Foreman v. Babcock & 
Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 806 (5th Cir. 1997) (explaining that the claimant could 
perfonn other work at the plant). 
488. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i); see Colwel!, 158 F.3d at 643-44; Foreman, 117 F.3d at 
806. 
489. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3). 
490. Bailey v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 306 F.3d 1162 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 
1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(AHc); Duncan v. Wash. Metro Area Transit Auth., 240 F.3d 1110, 
1115-16 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc». 
491. Thornton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 261 F.3d 789, 795-96 (9th Cir. 2001), 
clarified, 292 F .3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2002). 
492. Duncan, 240 F .3d at 1114-16. 
493. Duncan v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 201 F.3d 482, 489 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(Edwards, C.J., dissenting), on reh 'g 240 F.3d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
494. Duncan, 240 F .3d at 1115-16. 
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In this same case, the court later reversed a jury verdict in the 
claimant's favor, based on a lack of evidence establishing a 
substantial limitation on the ability to work, such as the number and 
type of jobs from which he was excluded. 495 Even though the court 
recognized that a claimant "need not necessarily produce expert 
vocational testimony," it apparently reversed based on a lack of such 
evidence, and noted that "such evidence might be very persuasive.,,496 
Justice Edwards again dissented because the claimant had presented 
some evidence of his personal characteristics and the job market from 
which a jury could conclude that he was covered by the ADA. 497 
The ramifications for an employee who fails to present what the 
court finds to be sufficient professional evidence in support of his or 
her impairment can be severe. 498 In another District of Columbia 
case, a police officer who could not engage in activities that could 
result in trauma because he was taking a blood-thinning medication 
was successful in front a jury,499 only to have the court of appeals 
reverse and enter judgment for the employer. 500 The court based its 
reversal on the lack of evidence from the vocational expert regarding 
the number of jobs he could not perform because they posed a risk of 
trauma, even though he did provide evidence that the employee was 
precluded from all but 28.6% of the jobs for which he was eligible 
without his impairment, assuming that he could only perform duties 
"that resembled the desk duties he [was performing] while [placed] 
on limited duty.,,501 
Even with medical evidence describing one's limitations, claims 
based on work limitations have failed for the lack of expert testimony 
on relevant labor markets and the claimant's level of training, 
knowledge, skills, or abilities. 502 In one claim, a medical expert's 
testimony that the claimant could not perform '''a substantial number 
of jobs, '" or even a medical opinion that the claimant could not work 
495. Id. 
496. Id. at 1117. 
497. Id. at 1124--25 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting). 
498. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 503-09. 
499. Gasser v. District of Columbia, 442 F.3d 758,761-62 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
500. Id. at 766. 
501. Id. at 761-62, 764--65. 
502. E.g., Walton v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 492 F.3d 998, 1009 (9th Cir. 2007); Breitkreutz 
v. Cambrex Charles City, Inc., 450 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 2006); Bristol v. Bd. of Cnty. 
Comm'rs, 281 F.3d 1148, 1162 (lOth Cir. 2002) (citing Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 
F.3d 939, 944 (10th Cir. 1994)), vacated in part on rehearing en bane, 312 F.3d 1213 
(lOth Cir. 2002). 
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at all, has been insufficient. 503 Courts have also rejected 
"conclusory" testimony from a doctor that the claimant was 
"significantly restricted" in their ability to work "compared to the 
average person in the working community" and the doctor's opinion 
that "the condition, manner or duration under which she can work are 
significantly restricted.,,504 
Even where a claimant presents expert testimony regarding his or 
her inability to work, courts sometimes engage in a determination of 
the value of the expert evidence to support a decision to deny ADA 
coverage on a motion for summary judgment. 505 Such "fact finding" 
by the courts is comparable to the discounting of some medical 
expert testimony discussed above. 506 For example, the Sixth Circuit 
held that a truck driver was not substantially limited in his ability to 
work where he could drive trucks if they were equipped with cruise 
control, and the record established "that a high percentage of [his 
employer's] trucks and ... trucks in general included cruise control 
as standard equipment.,,507 
Even though the truck driver's employer could not guarantee that 
he would only be required to drive trucks with cruise control, the 
court wanted to know "how many trucking jobs would require [the 
claimant] to drive trucks without cruise control.,,508 The employee's 
vocational expert opined that with his limitations, he would be 
prevented from working "'in approximately 75% of the type of jobs 
for which he [did] not have skills, but could have performed prior to 
[his knee injury].,,,509 This expert opinion was insufficient to defeat 
the employer's motion for summary judgment because the expert 
"did not provide any evidence regarding the number of trucking jobs 
from which [the employee was] disqualified," because of the need to 
drive without cruise control, "or the number of other jobs from which 
he [was] disqualified. ,,510 
The cases discussed above demonstrate how a claimant's remaining 
abilities can defeat ADA coverage. 511 Similarly, even expert 
503. Bristol, 281 F.3d at 1162; see also Zwygart v. Bd. ofCnty. Corrun'rs, 483 F.3d 1086, 
1092 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding doctor's opinion that claimant could not work was 
insufficient without vocational expert). 
504. Gonzalez v. El Dia, Inc., 304 F.3d 63, 73-74 (1st Cir. 2002). 
505. See supra text accompanying notes 486--504. 
506. See supra text accompanying notes 392, 461. 
507. Black v. Roadway Express, Inc., 297 F.3d 445, 452-54 (6th Cir. 2002). 
508. Id. at 453. 
509. Id. at 454. 
510. Id. at 454-55. 
511. See supra Part IV.A. 
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testimony regarding an inability to work a class or range of jobs may 
not prevent a court from focusing on the claimant's remaining 
abilities related to working. 512 A Federal Express employee, for 
example, was unable to establish a substantial limitation on his ability 
to lift or to work, despite testimony from a vocational expert that he 
was unable to perform 57% of the jobs for which he was qualified 
absent his impairment. 513 Instead of sending the claim to a jury, the 
Fourth Circuit dismissed it based on the employee's continued ability 
to "perform a range of daily activities requiring endurance, flexibility 
and some strength," and his continued qualification "for over 1,400 
different types of jobs and over 130,000 actual jobs" in his 
geographic area. 514 Making its own interpretation of that evidence, 
the court concluded that "a reasonable juror could not find that his 
impairment substantially limits his ability to work, or for that reason 
renders him disabled for purposes of the ADA.,,515 
Other employees who have presented what the courts see as 
powerful expert testimony regarding their restrictions on working 
have been more successful. 516 One employee who was denied a 
position as a shift supervisor successfully survived a motion for 
summary judgment in the Eighth Circuit using expert testimony 
showing an exclusion from at least 70% of the jobs listed in the 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles. 517 Similarly, a court upheld a jury 
verdict in favor of an employee who offered expert testimony that her 
"'potential occupational base' was substantially reduced by her 
impairments.,,518 The Tenth Circuit, reviewing that verdict, noted 
that the expert's testimony "was detailed and was supported by his 
description of the workplace ramifications of [her] condition.,,519 
These cases establish that fairly detailed, well-supported expert 
testimony has been required to establish a limitation from a "less than 
obvious" condition or in the ability to work. 
3. Limited Effect of ADAAA on Reliance on Expert Evidence 
The ADAAA and the EEOC ADAAA regulations do little to 
resolve these drastically different approaches to the necessity of 
512. See supra text accompanying note 510. 
513. Taylor v. Fed. Express Corp., 429 F.3d 461, 463-64 (4th Cir. 2005). 
514. Id.at464. 
515. Id. at 465. 
516. See supra text accompanying note 479. 
517. See Chalfant v. Titan Distrib., Inc., 475 F.3d 982, 989 (8th Cir. 2007). 
518. Praseuth v. Rubberrnaid, Inc., 406 F.3d 1245, 1251 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting the 
claimant's expert witness). 
519. Id. 
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medical or vocational expert evidence. The regulations do state that 
the comparison of the person's abilities to the general population 
"usually will not require scientific, medical or statistical evidence."s2o 
Yet the final regulations also make it explicit that the presentation of 
such evidence is not prohibited "where appropriate."S2 In discussing 
mitigating measures, the Appendix to the regulations provides some 
guidance to the courts that expert evidence should not be required 
when it states that the definition of disability "should not demand 
extensive analysis," and notes that "covered entities and courts will in 
many instances be able to conclude that a substantial limitation has 
been shown without resort to such evidence."s22 
With respect to a substantial limitation on the ability to work, the 
ADAAA regulations retain the requirement that a person show a 
limitation on performing a class of jobs or broad range of jobs. In its 
explanation for retaining this standard, the EEOC states that a 
determination of coverage "should not require extensive and 
elaborate assessment."S23 The terms "class of jobs" and "broad range 
of jobs" are to be "applied in a more straightforward and simple 
manner than they were applied by the courts" prior to the 
ADAAA.S24 
Despite this general indication of the EEOC's approach, neither the 
ADAAA nor the regulations explain when, if ever, expert medical or 
vocational testimony should be required on a motion for summary 
judgment. In some courts, including the Ninth Circuit, a claimant 
may survive a motion for summary judgment based on his or her 
testimony alone. 525 
In other courts, claimants may still be required to present expert 
medical or vocational testimony even in response to a motion for 
summary judgment. 526 This requirement arises in some courts only 
with less obvious types of impairments, such as the inability to lift or 
work. 52? 
The ADAAA regulations may even contribute to the tendency of 
courts to require expert testimony. In discussing mitigating 
measures, for example, the regulations state that a person could show 
520. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(\)(v) (2010). 
521. Id. 
522. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. 
523. Id. 
524. Id. 
525. See supra text accompanying notes 102-103,280,475-77. 
526. See supra Part lV.D. 
527. See supra Part IV.D.1. 
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substantial limitation with the effects of a mitigating measure with 
"evidence concerning the exgected courts of a particular disorder 
absent mitigating measures." 8 Such evidence would need to come 
from a medical expert. 
Without further clarification, requirements for expert testimony 
will continue to place a significant burden on ADA claimants seeking 
a trial on the substance of their discrimination claim. Moreover, the 
reliance on expert testimony, or the lack thereof, in granting 
employers motions for summary judgment will continue to 
undermine the role of the jury in making factual determinations 
associated with determining whether an impairment is substantially 
limiting. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This failure of the ADAAA to resolve these issues may result in a 
continuation of dismissing claims on motions for summary judgment. 
In fact, courts that have interpreted the ADA narrowly under these 
controversial issues may feel emboldened by the fact that Congress 
failed to reverse their interpretations of the original ADA in the 
ADAAA. 529 In addition, without Supreme Court intervention, 
plaintiffs will see a variety of outcomes regarding ADA coverage 
depending on which district or circuit court hears their claim, since 
the courts vary considerably in their interpretations of what it means 
to be "substantially limited" in a major life activity. In each of these 
areas, courts may remain free to resolve these fact-intensive issues 
rather than allowing a jury to determine whether the claimant is 
covered by the ADA's protections. 
These decisions that interpret the meaning of "substantially limits" 
illustrate how the original ADA failed to live up to the hopes of 
persons with disabilities and their advocates. Some circuits in 
particular are often willing to make factual determinations about the 
extent of the effects of an employee's impairment. 53o If excluded 
from ADA coverage based on these determinations, these employees 
have no protection against discrimination based on their disability 
and no right to reasonable accommodations. 
After years of criticism of the Supreme Court for limiting the 
ADA's coverage, Congress responded with the ADAAA and directed 
the EEOC to broaden coverage through its regulations. 531 Some 
528. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 Summary app. 
529. Cox, supra note 2, at 208 & n.100. 
530. See supra text accompanying notes 104, 133, 171-172. 
53l. See supra text accompanying notes 2, 7l. 
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barriers to ADA created by the Supreme Court, such as the effect of 
mitigating measures and the requirements to establish a "regarded as" 
claim, have been directly addressed by the ADAAA's language. 532 
Yet other ambiguities regarding the application of the "substantially 
limits" requirement, described above, have not been addressed by 
either the ADAAA's language or the EEOC ADAAA regulations. 533 
This may prove to be an influential gap in the ADAAA's protection, 
since these ambiguities have resulted in the exclusion of numerous 
ADA claimants from coverage prior to the ADAAA's passage. 
Leaving these issues once again to the Supreme Court, even with 
the broad purposes stated in support of the ADAAA, may not result 
in sufficiently broad ADA coverage. Even the EEOC's ADAAA 
regulations may be insufficient. Professor Selmi has explained that 
"the Court adopts EEOC interpretations when they support the 
decision and ignores them when they do not, and ... [t]he Court 
emphasizes statutory language and sentence structure in some cases 
but turns its eye on clear language in others.,,534 
Without an effective social movement to positively influence 
courts' interpretation of the AD A, 535 claimants may still have their 
claims dismissed because they are not limited in all tasks that require 
the performance of a major life activity, because the effects of their 
impairment are not permanent or frequent enough, because they have 
failed to make a comparison to the general population, or because 
they cannot present sufficient expert testimony as to their 
impairment. 536 As Professor Selmi observed before the passage of 
the ADAAA, "[w]ith greater social pressure or attention [to these 
more specific issues], Congress may have drafted more specific 
legislation, or at least addressed some of the imminent issues more 
clearly.,,537 
Without such amendments or more specific guidance from the 
EEOC, courts may be free to continue to dismiss claims on motions 
for summary judgment because the impairment has not been shown 
to "substantially limit" a major life activity of the claimant. 
Therefore, plaintiffs are well advised to continue to present evidence 
regarding the extended duration or frequency of the limitations, as 
well as the abilities of either the average person or most people in the 
532. See supra text accompanying note 4. 
533. See supra Part IV.A. 
534. Se1mi, supra note 13, at 570. 
535. Id. at 571. 
536. See supra Part IV.A-D. 
537. Se1mi, supra note 13, at 573. 
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general population. Perhaps most importantly, plaintiffs facing 
summary judgment may need to continue to present medical or 
vocational testimony regarding the extent of the limitation rather than 
relying on the plaintiff's own description of his or her limitations. 538 
Even if ADA claimants present the evidence of substantial 
limitation that has been required under the unamended ADA, they 
may still be unsuccessful unless courts respect the fact-finding role of 
juries. In light of the failure of either the ADAAA or the EEOC 
ADAAA regulations to command this respect, the Supreme Court, or 
at least the circuit courts, must fulfill the promise of the ADA to 
protect working people with disabilities against discrimination by 
referring arguably valid claims to juries. 539 Then, a jury can interpret 
the evidence in light of its common understanding of the abilities of a 
non-disabled person to determine if the claimant with an impairment 
deserves protection against discrimination. Without attention to these 
continuing barriers to ADA claims, the impact of the amendments to 
the ADA may be at most underwhelming. 
538. See supra Part IV.D. 
539. See supra text accompanying notes 288-89, 475-77, 483. 
